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Two studies used a thought-listing technique to examine perceived superiority, or the inclination to 
regard one's own relationship as better than (and not as bad as) others' relationships. Consistent with the 
claim that this is a motivated phenomenon--and motivated in part by strong commitment--Study 1 
revealed that (a) tendencies toward perceived superiority and (b) the commitment-superiority link are 
both strongest given psychologically threatening instructions and weakest given accuracy instructions 
(control instructions are intermediate). Consistent with the claim t a  this phenomenon serves a func- 
tional purpose, Study 2 revealed that earlier perceived superiority predicts later relationship status 
(persisted vs. ended) andincreases over time in dyadic adjustment. Also, commitment accounts for 
unique variance in perceived superiority be ond self-esteem. 
The beliefs individuals hold about hemselves tend to be some- 
what more positive than a strictly veridical view of the world can 
support. Research regarding the self has identified three primary 
forms of positive illusion, demonstrating that we exhibit exces- 
sively positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of con- 
trol, and unrealistic optimism regarding the future (for reviews, see 
Taylor & Brown, 1988; Wood, 1989). The empirical iterature 
reveals parallel phenomena in close relationships, demonstrating 
that we exhibit excessively positive valuations ofour partners and 
relationships, exaggerated belief in the controllability of our rela- 
tionships, and unrealistic optimism regarding the future of our 
involvements (Buunk & Van Yperen, 1991; Martz et al., 1998; 
Murray & Holmes, 1993, 1997; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 
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1996a, 1996b; Van Lange & Rusbult, 1995; Van Lange, Rusbult, 
Goossens, G6rts, & Stalpers, 1999). 
The present research examines a phenomenon termed perceived 
superiority, which is defined as the inclination to regard one's own 
relationship as both better than and not as bad as other people's 
relationships: This work is based on the assumption that we do not 
experience our relationships in a vacuum: Although beliefs about 
a relationship are shaped in part by the good and bad properties of 
the relationship per se, beliefs are also socially defined. That is, we 
also understand and experience our involvements in relation to the 
beliefs we hold about he good and bad properties of other people's 
involvements. 
The conceptual model guiding our analysis of this phenomenon 
rests on three primary assertions. First, we propose that belief 
systems are subject o motivated processing, suggesting that indi- 
viduals exhibit perceived superiority in part because they need to 
regard their relationships favorably. Second, we propose that com- 
mitment is a central variable in ongoing relationships, uggesting 
that strong commitment a least partially accounts for the inclina- 
tion toward perceived superiority. Third, we suggest that perceived 
superiority serves a functional purpose, representing a habit of 
thought hat supports couple well-being. 
Our work extends the existing literature in several respects. To 
begin with, our method of assessing perceived superiority exam- 
ines naturally occurring beliefs about relationships, using a 
thought-listing procedure that allows individuals to express a 
broad range of beliefs, including properties of the self, partner, and 
dyad. Also, we obtain direct evidence of the motivational proper- 
ties of beliefs, effecting manipulations of instructional set to dem- 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2000, Vol. 79 No. 4, 521-545 
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/00/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.79.4.521 
521 
522 RUSBULT ET AL. 
onstrate that differing motives yield differing tendencies toward 
perceived superiority. Moreover, we identify what it is about 
relationships that motivates superior beliefs, examining the asso- 
ciation of commitment with perceived superiority and demonstrat- 
ing that the strength of this association varies as a function of 
differing motives. Finally, we examine the interpersonal conse- 
quences of superior beliefs, demonstrating that earlier tendencies 
toward perceived superiority predict persistence in relationships a
well as changes over time in dyadic adjustment. 
Functional Value of Perceived Superiority 
We assume that perceived superiority develops as a conse- 
quence of adaptation tocircumstances of interdependence--that is, 
specific patterns of thinking presumably emerge and persist be- 
cause they have functional value and accordingly become habitual 
over the course of extended involvement. How so? Over time in a 
relationship, we encounter a variety of interdependence problems 
that threaten the stability of our involvements. Sometimes we 
confront threats to our relationships with a positive frame of mind; 
sometimes we address uch challenges with a more pessimistic, 
negative frame of mind. Compared with negative patterns of 
belief, positive patterns are more likely to "pay off' (cf. D. T. 
Miller & Tumbull, 1986). Over time, positive beliefs--in conjunc- 
tion with the good outcomes promoted by such beliefs--should 
become increasingly prominent, providing a basis for happiness, 
persistence, and well-being (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988). Although 
the functional value of superior beliefs may be limited when such 
tendencies are excessive (cf. Colvin & Block, 1994), we suggest 
that belief in the superiority of one's relationship generally is 
beneficial. Why might his be so? ~ 
First, perceived superiority may help us cope with inevitable 
challenges to our relationships. Even the most idyllic relationship 
may be threatened by problems uch as conflicting interests or 
tempting alternatives. The resolution of such problems frequently 
calls for departures from one's direct self-interest. For example, 
we may find it necessary to accommodate rather than retaliate 
when a partner behaves badly or to sacrifice personal preferences 
when confronted with noncorrespondent outcomes (Rusbult, Ver- 
ette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991; Van Lange et al., 1997). 
Positive belief systems arguably facilitate effective coping by 
increasing the availability of positive solutions to interdependence 
problems, by enhancing the likelihood of prosocial transformation 
of motivation, and by promoting willingness to invest in a rela- 
tionship in material and nonmaterial ways, all of which should help 
relationships persist through both good and bad times. Thus, 
perceived superiority may serve a relationship-enhancing fu ction, 
such that over time a positive reality is created by corresponding 
positive beliefs (cfo Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996; Snyder, 1984). 
Second, perceived superiority may help us sustain conviction i  
the face of uncertainty and doubt (cf. Brickman, 1987; Murray & 
Holmes, 1993). It is not always easy to remain convinced that a 
relationship is good and desirable or that it will survive the 
challenges with which it is routinely confronted--ongoing rela- 
tionships may suffer low periods that arouse feelings of dissatis- 
faction or doubt. Also, we are confronted with a good deal of 
threatening information about relationships--friends routinely suf- 
fer difficult periods in their relationships, and it is easy to feel 
alarmed when we encounter statistics regarding rates of relation- 
ship dissolution. When confronted with information that engenders 
doubt or uncertainty, perceived superiority may provide reassur- 
ance that our own relationships are relatively immune to such 
threats. We may dissociate our relationships from a gloomy frame 
of reference (e.g., bringing to mind cautionary tales; a contrast 
effect) or link our own relationships with real or imagined rela- 
tionships possessing ideal qualities (e.g., bringing to mind simi- 
larities between our own relationships and "perfect" relationships 
encountered in life or in fiction; an assimilation effect; cf. 
Schwarz, 1999). 
Previous research regarding illusory beliefs provides ome ev- 
idence of the interpersonal benefits of positive illusion: Belief that 
one's relationship s more equitable than other people's relation- 
ships is associated with concurrent marital satisfaction (Buunk & 
Van Yperen, 1991). Idealization ofone's partner is associated with 
concurrent satisfaction and with declines over time in conflict and 
doubt (Murray et al., 1996a, 1996b). And illusory beliefs regarding 
the desirability of a partner, the controllability of a relationship, 
and the rosiness of a relationship's future predict probability of 
persistence and increases over time in satisfaction (Murray & 
Holmes, 1997). The present work contributes to this growing 
literature by examining whether earlier tendencies toward per- 
ceived superiority predict probability of persistence and increases 
over time in dyadic adjustment. 
Motivational Properties of Perceived Superiority 
Belief systems presumably are constrained by realitymthoughts 
regarding our own and other people's relationships at least par- 
tially reflect he reality of everyday experience. At the same time, 
we suggest hat beliefs to some degree are illusory, or colored by 
motivational processes--in part, beliefs reflect the fervent hope 
that one's own relationship s all that one might wish it to be. The 
precise blend of reality and illusion presumably varies over time. 
Some everyday experiences are likely to enhance the need to 
regard one's own relationship ina favorable light, more powerfully 
activating the mechanisms that support illusion (cf. Kruglanski, 
1990; Kunda, 1990). For example, when struggling to resist a 
tempting alternative, one may be especially inclined to seek con- 
sensual validation from friends ("my partner is more affectionate 
than most people, isn't he?"); during periods of conflict one may 
be especially prone to selective attention, paying particular atten- 
tion to negative features of others' relationships ("other couples 
are physically abusive"). Thus, we propose that beliefs regarding 
our own and others' relationships reflect a blend of reality and 
illusion and that certain psychological states, such as the experi- 
ence of psychological threat, will yield enhanced tendencies to- 
ward perceived superiority. 2 
Following a parallel line of reasoning, it seems likely that other 
psychological states, such as the need for accuracy, may partially 
"deactivate" the mechanisms supporting illusion (Allison, Mes- 
sick, & Goethals, 1989; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). 
1 It should be clear that when we describe positive illusion as "function- 
al," we mean that it is functional for the relationship. There may be 
situations in which that which is good for a relationship does not align 
perfectly with that which is good for the individual. 
2 At the same time, one might speculate hat conditions ofpsychological 
threat could yield the opposite ffect. When one feels anxious and threat 
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For example, when it is critical for one to make an informed 
decision regarding the future of a relationship, one may be espe- 
cially prone to carefully review the negative properties of involve- 
ments ("we work very long hours; does it make sense to have a 
baby right now?"). It seems unlikely that illusion--or the need to 
regard one's own relationship as superior--will completely disap- 
pear under such circumstances, in that the need to sustain convic- 
tion in one's own relationship arguably is relatively pervasive and 
adaptive. Thus, we suspect that accuracy goals attenuate inclina- 
tions toward superior beliefs--that is, accuracy goals are likely to 
reduce but not eliminate tendencies toward perceived superiority. 3 
Previous studies of positive illusion have used a variety of 
benchmarks against which to assess whether beliefs are illusory. 
Some investigators have examined illusion by assessing whether 
individuals evaluate their partners more favorably than the partner 
evaluates the self (Murray et al., 1996a, 1996b). Other investiga- 
tors have examined illusion by assessing whether individuals eval- 
uate their own relationships more favorably than they evaluate 
others' relationships (Buunk & Van Yperen, 1991; Martz et al., 
1998; Murray & Holmes, 1997). However, far fewer studies have 
examined the motivational properties of illusion by means of the 
direct manipulation ofmotives. Some researchers have used threat 
manipulations to study perceptions of conflict, evaluations of 
alternative partners, and empathic accuracy (Johnson & Rusbult, 
1989; Murray & Holmes, 1993; Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 
1995). We know of no investigations examining relationship- 
relevant beliefs in which accuracy goals have been examined. 
In the present work, we actively manipulate instructional set, 
proposing that if belief systems are subject o motivational forces, 
differing instructions hould yield differing levels of perceived 
superiority. When individuals feel psychologically threatened, 
they should be powerfully inclined to regard their relationships a  
superior; when motivated by accuracy goals, they should exhibit 
reduced tendencies toward perceived superiority. To provide fur- 
ther evidence of the illusory component of perceived superiority, 
we will assess whether the inclination to describe one's own 
relationship as superior is evident beyond a measure of relation- 
ship quality that arguably is relatively uninfluenced by motiva- 
tional forces. If tendencies toward perceived superiority exceed 
that which (a) is evident when individuals are asked to be as 
accurate as possible and (b) is attributable to the "objective qual- 
ity" of a relationship, then we may more confidently conclude that 
this tendency is colored by illusion. 
Mechanisms Underlying Positive Illusion 
The preceding analysis provides a framework in which to un- 
derstand when and why illusion is beneficial. Of course, illusory 
beliefs are not necessarily consciously acquired, nor do the mech- 
anisms underlying such patterns necessarily result from deliberate 
ened, one could obsessively focus on the negative features of one's 
relationships (and the good features of others' relationships). Also, assum- 
ing that negative information may be more salient and available for one's 
own relationships than for others' relationships, when one feels anxious 
and threatened, negative thoughts about one's relationship might readily 
come to mind; parallel negative thoughts regarding others' relationships 
might be considerably less available. 
effort. On critical occasions one may consciously bring about such 
a frame of mind--for example, one may deliberately achieve a 
sense of gratitude by reviewing his or her partner's finest qualities 
or by bringing to mind the limitations of others' relationships. But 
more typically, positive illusion presumably represents a relatively 
automatic habit of thinking. The present work does not examine 
the precise mechanisms accounting for positive illusion. Never- 
theless, it is important to identify one or more mechanisms that 
may, individually or collectively, account for this phenomenon. 
The ability to develop and sustain belief in the superiority of 
one's own relationship arguably rests in part on the nature of the 
information we possess about our own and others' relationships 
(cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1991). It would seem that in general, individ- 
uals might hold relatively positive beliefs about relationships: 
Presumably, relationships ersist in part because they yield good 
outcomes. Indeed, abstract beliefs about interpersonal relations 
tend to be fairly positive (cf. Fiske, 1980; Skowronski & Carlston, 
1989). In such a positive context, negative information should be 
especially salient and vivid (e.g., gossip captures our attention and 
is memorable; cf. Fiske, 1980; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). Assum- 
ing that one possesses more information about one's own.relation- 
ships than others' relationships--and assuming that people ngage 
in some degree of impression management i  everyday life, pre- 
senting a more positive picture of their relationships than objec- 
tively may be warranted--it would seem logical that one would 
hold both more positive and more negative information regarding 
one's own relationships than others' relationships. 
We suggest that the availability and salience of negative infor- 
mation is softened or overshadowed in thinking about one's own 
relationships by means of motivated cognitive processes such as 
(a) selective attention, encoding, or retrieval; (b) consensual vali- 
dation provided by like-minded friends and kin who support rather 
than disconfirm one's positive beliefs; and (c) the breadth of 
information one holds about one's own relationships, including 
information about positive internal events uch as good intentions 
and effort expenditure (cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In addition, 
social comparison may play a role in developing and maintaining 
illusion by means of (a) downward comparison--comparing o e's 
own relationships with actual or imagined relationships that are 
worse off; (b) dimensional comparison--selectively focusing on 
dimensions for which one's own relationship is advantaged; (c) 
manipulation of surrounding dimensions--bringing to mind infor- 
mation that discounts the apparent superiority of others' relation- 
ships; and (d) avoidance of comparison--ignoring formation that 
is likely to yield discouraging evidence (cf. Wills, 1991; Wood & 
Taylor, 1991). Thus, motivated cognition and social comparison 
may enable individuals to "see what they wish to see" by means of 
suppression, selective attention, and other defensive maneuvers. 
Such maneuvers allow individuals to construct charitable, even 
idealized, images of their partners and relationships while selec- 
tively attending to the less desirable properties of others' 
relationships. 
3 At the same time, one might speculate hat accuracy goals could yield 
the opposite ffect. It is easy to imagine that when one wishes to be as 
accurate as possible, one might feel especially motivated to regard one's 
relationships in an unambiguously favorable light. 
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Commitment as a Motivator of Perceived Superiority 
Presumably, tendencies toward perceived superiority vary 
across relationships. What accounts for such variability? We sug- 
gest that commitment is a key variable in ongoing relationships 
and propose that strong commitment motivates perceived superi- 
ority. Commitment level represents long-term orientation toward a 
relationship, emotional ttachment tothe relationship, and intent o 
persist. Commitment is strengthened to the degree that individuals 
are more dependent on theft relationships--to the extent hat (a) 
satisfaction level is high (the relationship gratifies important 
needs), (b) quality of alternatives i  poor (important needs could 
not easily be gratified independent of the relationship), and (c) 
important resources are invested in a relationship (identity, effort, 
material possessions; Rusbult, 1983). Consistent with these claims, 
the empirical literature reveals that satisfaction, alternatives, and 
investments contribute unique variance to predicting commitment 
and persistence (Bui, Peplau, & Hill, 1996; Felmiee, Sprecher, & 
Bassin, 1990; Rusbult, 1983). 
Why might committed individuals be motivated to regard their 
relationships as superior? First, committed individuals are depen- 
dent and literally need their relationships--important resources 
have been invested in the relationship, and the relationship fulfills 
important needs that cannot be gratified elsewhere. In a low- 
dependence r lationship, it is relatively easy to see things as they 
are, acknowledging both its good and not-so-good qualities, in 
contrast, dependent individuals have a considerable stake in per- 
ceiving theft relationships in a positive and optimistic light. 
Second, commitment involves long-term orientation. In addition 
to considering the here and now, committed individuals anticipate 
the future. Given short-term orientation, the only material avail- 
able for forming beliefs centers on that which currently exists-- 
perceptions are shaped by the (sometimes harsh) reality of the 
current situation. Given long-term orientation, beliefs are not lim- 
ited to the here and now the potential for illusion is enlarged, in 
that beliefs may be based in part on idealized fantasies about hat 
which might come to pass in the future. In addition, the psycho- 
logical costs of confronting a harsh reality are greater when tem- 
poral span is extended than when temporal span is limited. 
Third, commitment involves emotional attachment. Committed 
individuals develop collective representations of the self, yielding 
some degree of self-other merger (Agnew, Van Lange, Rusbult, & 
Langston, 1998; cf. Aron & Aron, 1997). Over time, the mecha- 
nisms that normally promote se/f-enhancement may come to pro- 
mote relationship-enhancement--that which is good about the 
relationship may become inseparable from that which is good 
about the self. Thus, committed individuals may exhibit superior 
beliefs in part because nhancing the relationship s tantamount to
enhancing the self. 
Fourth, strong commitment may induce collectivistic, ommu- 
nal orientation (cf. Clark & Mills, 1979). To the extent that 
committed individuals are communally oriented, they may not 
only enact prorelationship behaviors in a relatively unconditional 
manner, but may also exhibit somewhat unconditional cceptance 
of the partner and relationship, interpreting both positive and 
negative qualities in the best possible light. That is, commitment 
may strengthen the individual's desire to rather unconditionally 
accept he partner and relationship, embracing negative attributes 
and cognitively transforming faults into virtues (Murray & 
Holmes, 1993). 
In short, we propose that when people are strongly committed to 
their relationships, they have a greater need to regard their rela- 
tionships in a favorable light. Assuming that beliefs are socially 
defined--that is, assuming that one understands and experiences 
one's own involvement in relation to the beliefs one holds about 
other involvements--it follows that highly committed individuals 
will be motivated to perceive that their relationships ossess more 
positive attributes (and fewer negative attributes) than others' 
relationships. Some research provides indirect support for the 
claim that commitment might promote perceived superiority, in 
that commitment has been shown to be associated with prorela- 
tionship cognitive tendencies, uch as excessive optimism and 
unrealistic perceptions of control (Martz et al., 1998), plural pro- 
noun use in descriptions ofa relationship (Agnew et al., 1998), and 
the derogation of tempting alternatives (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; 
R. S. Miller, 1997). Also, commitment is associated with prorela- 
tionship maintenance acts, such as willingness to sacrifice (Van 
Lange et al., 1997) and accommodation (Rusbult et al., 1991). 
However, to claim that commitment motivates perceived supe- 
riority, one must do more than demonstrate hat committed indi- 
viduals describe their relationships more favorably than they de- 
scribe others' relationships. How is one to know that such a 
tendency reflects more than the fact that high commitment rela- 
tionships really are better than the average relationship, at least 
with regard to the attributes that a given individual regards as 
important? How is one to know that such a tendency reflects more 
than the fact that low commitment relationships really are inferior? 
To conclude that commitment motivates superior beliefs--that is, 
to conclude that commitment reflects, at least in part, the need to 
regard one's own relationship as relatively favored--it must be 
demonstrated that the motivational effects of commitment can be 
"turned on and off." That is, it must be shown that the psycholog- 
ical states that are argued to activate and deactivate illusion like- 
wise active and deactivate he commitment-superiority link.Thus, 
we suggest hat the commitment-superiority association will be 
strongest when individuals feel psychologically threatened and 
will be weakest when individuals are motivated by accuracy goals. 
Measurement of Perceived Superiority 
In the present work, we examine perceived superiority using a 
relatively unobtrusive, open-ended thought-listing task that reveals 
individuals' natural belief systems. Participants were asked to list 
the positive and negative qualities that came to mind when think- 
ing about heir own and others' relationships. Perceived superiority 
is reflected in the tendency to (a) hold a greater number of positive 
thoughts regarding one's own relationship than others' relation- 
ships and (b) hold fewer negative thoughts regarding one's own 
relationship than others' relationships. 
Although some research regarding self-other judgments and 
self-relevant social comparison has examined how comparison 
beliefs are expressed in individuals' spontaneous, everyday 
thoughts (e.g., Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; 
Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985), thus far, most research in the 
relationships domain has used researcher-structured m thods. As 
Wood et al. (1985) noted, "free-response comparisons.., may be 
more central to the [individual's] experience than the comparisons 
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elicited by investigator-designed questions" (p. 1172). In addition 
to examining naturally occurring thoughts, our technique allows 
for the expression of a broad range of relationship-relevant beliefs, 
including properties of the self, partner, and dyad. 
Our measurement technique appears to be reliable and valid in 
that we have observed parallel findings for (a) the present wo- 
category measurement system wherein positive and negative be- 
liefs are categorized as typical of either one's own or others' 
relationships, (b) a three-category system wherein beliefs are cat- 
egorized as typical of one's own relationship, others' relationships, 
or both own and others' relationships, and (c) a system using 
continuous cales to independently assess perceptions of one's 
own and others' relationships (Martz et al., 1998; Van Lange & 
Rusbult, 1995). Measures of perceived superiority obtained using 
the present technique also exhibit good test-retest consistency and 
are largely uncolored by tendencies toward socially desirable 
responding. 4 
We designed two studies to test hypotheses relevant o the 
propositions that perceived superiority (a) reliably exists, (b) re- 
flects motivated processing, (c) is promoted by strong commit- 
ment, and (d) yields enhanced couple well-being. Study 1 is a 
laboratory experiment that examines young adults' dating relation- 
ships, and Study 2 uses data from a longitudinal study of married 
partners. Study 1 examines the motivational properties of per- 
ceived superiority, whereas Study 2 focuses largely on the conse- 
quences of perceived superiority for couple well-being. 
Study 1 
The first hypothesis examined in Study 1 concerns the existence 
and form of perceived superiority. Using our 2 × 2 within- 
participant thought-listing technique, total perceived superiority is
the interaction of Item Valence (positive vs. negative ~oughts) × 
Item Target (own relationship vs. other relationships). This phe- 
nomenon can be decomposed into four effects. Hypothesis 1 
suggests that participants will exhibit (a) positive superiority-- 
more positive thoughts about one's own relationship than others' 
relationships; (b) negative superiority--fewer negative thoughts 
about one's own relationship than others' relationships; (c) own 
relationship ositivity--more positive than negative thoughts 
about one's own relationship; and (d) other elationships negativ- 
i ty -more negative than positive thoughts about others' relation- 
ships. The several forms of perceived superiority are not indepen- 
dent of one another, they are simply different ways of "carving up" 
our 2 × 2 thought-listing data. However, it is useful to examine all 
four forms of superiority, as well as all four types of thought, to 
illuminate the unique patterns of belief that characterize individ- 
uals' thoughts about relationships. We held the general expectation 
that our hypotheses would receive support for all four forms of 
superiority (as well as for all four types of thought). 
A second hypothesis relevant to the assertion that perceived 
superiority involves motivated processing. We assume that per- 
ceptions of a relationship are constrained by reality--that individ- 
uals who are involved in good relationships will tend to describe 
their relationships more favorably than will those who are in poor 
relationships. At the same time, we assume that beliefs regarding 
relationships are responsive to motivational forces. In Study 1, we 
varied thought-listing instructions to manipulate motives, examin- 
ing tendencies toward perceived superiority given psycholog- 
ically threatening instructions, control instructions, and accuracy 
instructions. 
To assess the effects of threat we compare results in the threat 
condition with results in the control and accuracy conditions. The 
control condition does not include motivation-relevant i struc- 
tions, so this condition serves as a natural baseline, yet one that 
presumably reflects at least moderate tendencies toward illusion; 
the accuracy condition is a baseline that provides a closer approx- 
imation of reality. These two baselines follow from the assertion 
that beliefs about relationships reflect a blend of reality and illu- 
sion. A comparison of the control and accuracy conditions is 
germane to hypotheses regarding the deactivation of motivated 
processing iven accuracy goals. 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that participants who receive psycholog- 
ically threatening instructions will exhibit greater perceived supe- 
riority than will those who receive control or accuracy instructions. 
If superior beliefs rest in part on motivational forces, when their 
conviction is threatened, individuals hould exhibit enhanced su- 
periority ("illusion" should be more evident). Hypothesis 2b pre- 
dicts that compared with participants in the control condition, 
those given accuracy instructions will exhibit reduced perceived 
superiority. If perceived superiority is partially real and partially 
motivated, and if we urge individuals to be as accurate as possible 
in describing relationships, they should exhibit reduced superiority 
("reality" should be more evident). 
A third hypothesis i  relevant o the assertion that perceived 
superiority is motivated by strong commitment. Of course, a 
prerequisite is that commitment must be positively associated with 
perceived superiority (Hypothesis 3a). However, assuming that 
superior beliefs rest on both reality and illusion, it may be that (a) 
objectively good relationships inspire strong commitment along 
with realistically high scores on our perceived superiority measure, 
or that (b) commitment motivates unrealistically positive thoughts 
about one's own relationship along with unrealistically negative 
thoughts about others' relationships, yielding illusory perceived 
superiority. We use several strategies to "separate illusion from 
reality." 
First, assuming that the motivational properties of commitment 
are particularly active under conditions of threat, we should find 
that the commitment-superiority association is stronger among 
participants who receive psychologically threatening instructions 
than among those who receive control or accuracy instructions 
(Hypothesis 3b). Second, if we assume that the motivational prop- 
erties of commitment are only weakly activated given accuracy 
instructions, we should find that the commitment-superiority as- 
sociation is weaker among participants who receive accuracy in- 
structions than among those who receive control instructions (Hy- 
pothesis 3c). 
Finally, if commitment motivates superior beliefs, then commit- 
meut should account for unique variance in perceived superiority 
beyond reality, or beyond the objective quality of a relationship. It 
4 Ill unpublished work using the present technique, we found that the 
number of positive and negative thoughts individuals ist for their own and 
others' relationships (a) exhibit good test-retest reliability over an 8-week 
period (rs = .51, .54, .47, and .54, all ps < .01) and (b) are unrelated to 
socially desirable responding (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; rs = -.01, 
-.18, -.15, and .11, all ns). 
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is not a simple matter to assess objective quality, in that 
participant-provided descriptions may themselves be colored by 
illusion. In Study 1, we used evaluations of  specific relationship 
attributes as a gauge of  objective quality (e.g., partner physical 
attractiveness, attitudinal similarity). This decision rests on the 
assumption that the more concrete and specific the measure of  
relationship quality, the less the measure will be tainted by illu- 
sion. Indeed, the empirical literature reveals that tendencies toward 
positively biased evaluation are greater for global, abstract judg- 
ments than for specific, concrete judgments (Dunning et al., 1989; 
Dunning & McElwee, 1995; Van Lange & Rusbult, 1995). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3d predicts that commitment will account for unique 
variance in perceived superiority beyond evaluations of  specific 
relationship attributes. 3 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred forty-nine undergraduates (151 women, 98 
men) volunteered to take part in the study in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for introductory psychology courses at the University of 
North Carolina. Participants took part in the study in same-sex groups 
ranging in size from 3 to 8 persons. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three experimental conditions, with approximately equal propor- 
tions of women and men across conditions. 6 Participants were 19.12 years 
old on average, most were freshmen or sophomores (52% freshmen, 33% 
sophomores, 11% juniors, 4% seniors), and the majority were Caucasian 
(10% African American, 1% Asian American, 87% Caucasian, 2% Other). 
Participants' relationships were an average of 16.08 months in duration; 
most participants described their relationships as steady dating relation- 
ships (3% engaged, 77% dating steadily, 13% dating regularly, 4% dating 
casually, 3% other) and indicated that neither they nor their partners dated 
others (87% said neither dated others, 6% said either they or their partners 
dated others, 7% said both dated others). 
Procedure. Sign-up sheets listed the following requirement: "To par- 
ticipate you must currently be involved in a dating relationship of at least 
three months in duration." The experiment was described as a study of 
attitudes and behavior in close relationships. First, participants completed 
a questionnaire d signed to measure commitment and obtain evaluations of 
specific relationship attributes. We measured commitment level using a 
version of the 7-item instrument from the Investment Model Scale (Rus- 
bult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998; e.g., "Do you feel committed to maintaining 
your relationship?" 0 = not at all committed, 8 = completely committed; 
a = .92). We obtained relationship attribute ratings using an expanded 
version of an instrument used in previous research regarding commitment 
and satisfaction (Rusbutt, 1983; Rusbult et al., 1991). This instrument 
obtains ratings of relationship quality on eight dimensions: exual gratifi- 
cation, compatibility, similarity of goals, similarity of attitudes, mutual 
support, partner physical attractiveness, partner sense of humor, and part- 
ner affirmation of the self (e.g., "My partner is very physically attractive" 
and "My partner and I have very similar attitudes"; for each item, 0 = don't 
agree at all, 8 = agree completely; a = .78). 
Next, the experimenter distributed materials for the thought-listing task, 
reviewed the instructions, and introduced one of three instructional sets. In 
the control instructions condition the experimenter simply explained, 
"We're interested in how your dating relationship may be similar to versus 
different from other people's dating relationships." In the threat instruc- 
tions condition the experimenter added to the control instructions, "We are 
especially interested in college students' dating relationships because pre- 
vious research as demonstrated that in comparison to other types of 
relationships, college students' relationships are less likely to persist over 
time and tend to exhibit lower levels of overall adjustment. Of course, this 
is not necessarily true of all college students' relationships--it's simply 
true on average." In contrast, in the accuracy instructions condition the 
experimenter added to the control instructions, "In describing your own 
and others' relationships we would like you to be as honest and accurate as 
you possibly can." 
Following Van Lange and Rusbult (1995), perceived superiority was 
assessed using a thought-listing measure obtained in the context of a 2 
(item valence: participants li ted positive vs. negative features of relation- 
ships) × 2 (item target: participants indicated whether items best described 
own relationship vs. other relationships) within-participant design. One 
page of the questionnaire asked participants obring to mind and describe 
good features of relationships (positive item valence condition), and a 
second page asked them to describe bad features (negative item valence 
condition). Instructions for the positive item valence condition read as 
follows: 
Good Things About Relationships and Partners 
Below, please list features Of romantic relationships and partners that 
you think of as good and desirable. If you think that a good feature is 
more typical of your relationship or partner than of others', begin the 
sentence with "My relationship.. ." or "My partner.. .  "; if you 
think that a good feature is more typical of others' relationships or 
partners than of yours, begin the sentence with "Other people's 
relationships... " or "Other people's partners...  " 
Instructions for the negative item valence condition were identical except 
that "bad" was substituted for "good" and "undesirable" was substituted for 
"desirable." Participants were given 5 rain to list positive features and 5 
rain to list negative features; the order in which they listed positive and 
negative features was counterbalanced across participants within each 
research session. At the end of the session, participants were thoroughly 
debriefed and thanked for their assistance. Trained undergraduate research 
assistants later scored participants' lists, recording the number of positive 
s Using evaluations of concrete relationship attributes to assess "objec- 
tive quality" is preferable to using a global measure of satisfaction level, 
which is likely to be influenced by the very motivational forces that we 
wish to examine. Compared with judgments regarding concrete attributes, 
global judgments (a) are more susceptible to filtering and idiosyncratic 
interpretation, whereby the individual brings to mind positive features of a 
relationship and ignores negative features (cf. Dunning et al., 1989; Wood 
& Taylor, 1991), (b) imply greater generalizability, and therefore induce 
more socially desirable responding (cf. Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998), and 
(c) imply less modifiability, in that such judgments frequently describe 
enduring qualities of a relationship (cf. Alicke, 1985). Thus, examining the 
"illusory" component of the commitment-superiority association by con- 
trolling for global satisfaction level would be tantamount toexamining the 
commitment-superiority association while controlling for illusion. In rela- 
tion to global satisfaction level, the use of a concrete attributes measure 
comes closer to assessing the objective quality of a relationship. 
6 This research originally was represented astwo separate xperiments. 
One experiment included the threat instructions condition and a control 
condition, and the second experiment included the accuracy instructions 
condition and a control condition. Given that the two control conditions 
were identical--and given that the experiments were conducted during the 
same semesters using the same participant population, experimenters, 
laboratories, and so forth it did not seem unreasonable to represent the 
experiments a  a single study with three experimental conditions. A total 
of 73, participants were assigned to the threat condition (46 women, 28 
men), 119 participants were assigned to the control condition (71 
women, 48 men), and 56 participants were assigned to the accuracy 
condition (34 women, 22 men). 
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Table 1 
Mean Number of Thoughts as a Function of Item Target, Item Valence, Experimental Condition, 
and Commitment Level: Study 1 
Positive item valence Negative item valence 
Own Other Own Other 
Condition relationship relationships relationship relationships 
Threat instructions condition 
High commitment 9.95 0.07 0.93 6.56 
Low commitment 6.82 1.48 2.85 4.29 
Control instructions condition 
High commitment 8.04 0.68 2.27 4.78 
Low commitment 6.73 1.34 3.75 2.91 
Accuracy instructions condition 
High commitment 6.61 1.47 4.15 2.61 
Low commitment 5.28 2.33 4.55 2.82 
Note. Table values reflect number of thoughts listed. The predicted means for commitment were conditioned 
at values of one standard eviation above and below the mean of commitment level (Aiken & West, 1991). 
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and negative thoughts listed for own relationship and for others' 
relationships. 7 
Results 
We performed a 6-factor analysis to test predictions associated 
with Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Two independent variables were 
within-participant variables: item valence (positive vs. negative 
thoughts) and item target (own relationship vs. other relation- 
ships). Three independent variables were categorical between- 
participant variables: experimental condition (threat vs. control vs. 
accuracy instructions), gender (male vs. female), and task order 
(positive vs. negative thoughts listed first). Commitment level was 
a continuous between-participant variable. Table 1 presents mean 
number of thoughts listed as a function of item valence, item 
target, experimental condition, and commitment level; the pre- 
dicted means for commitment were conditioned at values of one 
standard eviation above and below the mean of commitment level 
(Aiken & West, 1991). Table 2 summarizes the results of key 
analyses. 
Hypothesis 1: Existence and form of perceived superiority. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants would exhibit perceived 
superiority, regarding their own relationships as both better than 
and not as bad as other relationships. As expected, the Item 
Target × Item Valence interaction was significant (see Table 2 
under Is Perceived Superiority Evident?, Target × Valence inter- 
action row). Tests of simple effects revealed good support for all 
four forms of perceived superiority (see Table 2 under Tests of 
simple effects). Participants exhibited (a) positive superiority, list- 
ing a greater number of positive thoughts for their own than others' 
relationships; (b) negative superiority, listing fewer negative 
thoughts for their own than others' relationships; (c) own relation- 
ship positivity, listing a greater number of positive than negative 
thoughts for their own relationships; and (d) other relationships 
negativity, listing a greater number of negative than positive 
thoughts for others' relationships (see means in Table 1). 
Hypothesis 2: Impact of instructional set on perceived superi- 
or/ty. Hypothesis 2 predicted that if superior beliefs rest on 
motivated processing, tendencies toward perceived superiority 
should differ as a function of instructional set. As expected, the 
Target × Valence × Condition interaction was significant (see 
Table 2 under Is Perceived Superiority Differentially Evident 
Across Experimental Conditions?). Also, tests of simple effects 
revealed that the condition effect was significant for all four forms 
of perceived superiority, as well as for all four types of item--for 
both positive and negative items listed for one's own and others' 
relationships (see Table 2 under "Tests of simple effects, Condi- 
tion effect rows"). For the three-group condition effect, we have 
two degrees of freedom available for planned contrasts. To test 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b we (a) compared the threat condition with 
the control and accuracy conditions and (b) compared the control 
condition with the accuracy condition. 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that perceived superiority would be 
greater in the threat condition than in the control and accuracy 
conditions. As expected, the Target × Valence × Threat-Versus- 
Other-Conditions Contrast was significant (see Table 2 under Is 
Perceived Superiority Differentially Evident Across Experimental 
Conditions?). Tests of simple effects revealed that the threat- 
7 In both Study 1 and Study 2, after completing the thought-listing task, 
participants were asked to review their lists and assign a desirability rating 
to each item: "Now rate the desirability/undesirability of each feature using 
the following scale" ( -4  = not at all desirable, 4 = extremely desirable). 
In addition to counting the number of positive and negative thoughts listed 
for own and others' relationships, trained undergraduate research assistants 
also calculated the mean positivity versus negativity of thoughts listed for 
own and others' relationships. When participants failed to list any thoughts 
for a given category (e.g., when a participant listed no negative qualities for 
his or her own relationship), a mean rating of 0 was assigned for that 
category (cf. Van Lange & Rusbult, 1995). (We reasoned that if a partic- 
ipant listed no positive qualities for others' relationships, those relation- 
ships were regarded as neutral on average, at best; if a participant listed no 
negative qualities for his or her own relationship, the relationship was 
regarded as neutral on average, at worst.) To develop measures of average 
item ratings that paralleled the measures of number of items, we recorded 
the absolute value of participants' average ratings. (We recorded the 
absolute value of ratings so that in the negative item valence condition, 
high numbers reflect greater negativity, as is the case for the measure of 
number of thoughts.) Analyses performed using these average item ratings 
paralleled those observed for number of items. 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table: Study 1 
Effect F df p< 
Is Perceived Superiority Evident? 
Full model 
Item target main effect 241.18 1,222 .01 
Item valence main effect 54.20 1,222 .01 
Target × Valence interaction 334.08 1, 222 .01 
Tests of simple effects 
Positive superiority effect 622.40 1,222 .01 
Negative superiority effect 12.33 1,222 .01 
Own relationship ositivity effect 322.28 1,222 .01 
Other relationships negativity effect 213.22 1, 222 .01 
Is Perceived Superiority Differentially Evident Across Experimental Conditions? 
Full model 
Target x Valence × Condition 37.65 
Target × Valence x Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 63.03 
Target x Valence x Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 26.50 
Tests of simple effects: 
Positive superiority effect 
Condition effect 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 
Negative superiority effect 
Condition effect 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 
Own relationship ositivity effect 
Condition effect 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 
Other relationships negativity effect 
Condition effect 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 
Positive items for own relationship 
Condition effect 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 
Positive items for other relationships 
Condition effect 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 
Negative items for own relationship 
Condition effect 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 
Negative items for other elationships 
Condition effect 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast 
2, 222 .01 
1, 222 .01 
1,222 .01 
15.57 2, 222 .01 
22.35 1,222 .01 
15.40 1,222 .01 
28.60 2, 222 .01 
51.65 1,222 .01 
14.94 1,222 .01 
31.60 2, 222 .01 
51.77 1,222 .01 
23.70 1,222 .01 
29.17 2, 222 .01 
50.10 1, 222 .01 
18.87 1,222 .01 
9.05 2, 222 .01 
14.37 1,222 .01 
7.33 1, 222 .01 
11.53 2, 222 .01 
12.39 1,222 .01 
15.63 1,222 .01 
19.20 2, 222 .01 
32.34 1,222 .01 
13.26 1,222 .01 
18.01 2, 222 .01 
34.05 1,222 .01 
6.97 1,222 .01 
Is Perceived Superiority Differentially Evident as a Function of 
Commitment Level and Experimental Condition? 
Full model 
Target X Valence × Commitment 54.38 l, 222 .01 
Target X Valence × Condition X Commitment 5.55 2, 222 .01 
Target × Valence X Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions C trast X Commitment 10.10 1,222 .01 
Target X Valence X Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast X Commitment 2.51 1,222 .11 
Tests of simple effects 
Positive superiority effect 
Commitment effect 37.67 1,222 .01 
Condition X Commitment 3.38 2, 222 .04 
Threat-Versus-Other Conditions Contrast x Commitment 6.32 1,222 .01 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast X Commitment 0.03 1,222 .86 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Effect F df p< 
Is Perceived Superiority Differentially Evident as a Function of 
Commitment Level and Experimental Condition? (continued) 
Test of simple effects (continued) 
Negative superiority effect 
Commitment effect 25.57 1,222 .01 
Condition x Commitment 4.80 2, 222 .01 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions Contrast × Commitment 5.29 1,222 .02 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast × Commitment 6.11 1, 222 .01 
Own relationship ositivity effect 
Commitment effect 49.50 1, 222 .01 
Condition X Commitment 4.51 2, 222 .01 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions Contrast × Commitment 8.87 1,222 .01 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast × Commitment 0.88 t, 222 .35 
Other relationships negativity effect 
Commitment effect 37.74 1,222 .01 
Condition X Commitment 4.86 2, 222 .01 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions Contrast × Conmfitment 7.37 1,222 .01 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast x Commitment 4.06 1,222 .05 
Positive items for own relationship 
Commitment effect 20.74 1,222 .01 
Condition × Commitment 2.24 2, 222 .11 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions Contrast × Commitment 4.30 1, 222 .04 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast x Commitment 0.00 1, 222 .97 
Positive items for other elationships 
Commitment effect 29.54 1,222 .01 
Condition × Commitment 1.80 2, 222 .17 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions Contrast × Commitment 3.00 1,222 .08 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast x Commitment 0.19 1,222 .67 
Negative items for own relationship 
Commitment effect 18.83 1,222 .01 
Condition × Commitment 2.03 2, 222 .13 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions Contrast × Commitment 2.64 1, 222 .11 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast x Commitment 2.19 1, 222 .14 
Negative items for other relationships 
Commitment effect 14.57 1,222 .01 
Condition x Commitment 4.21 2, 222 .02 
Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions Contrast X Commitment 4.15 1,222 .04 
Control-Versus-Accuracy Contrast × Commitment 5.82 1,222 .02 
Note. Table values are Fs from six-factor analyses including two within-participant variables (item target and 
item valence) and four between-participant variables (experimental condition [threat vs. control vs. accuracy], 
sex, task order, and commitment). 
versus-other-conditions contrast was significant for all four forms 
of perceived superiority, as well as for all four types of item--for 
positive and negative items listed for one's own and others' 
relationships (see Table 2 under Tests of simple effects, Threat- 
versus-other-conditions rows). Compared with the levels of per- 
ceived superiority evident in the control and accuracy conditions, 
under conditions of psychological threat, participants exhibited 
reliably greater perceived superiority (see means in Table 1 under 
Condition). 
Hypothesis 2b predicted that levels of perceived superiority 
would be lower in the accuracy condition than in the control 
condition. As expected, the Target x Valence X Control-Versus- 
Accuracy Contrast was significant. Tests of simple effects revealed 
that the control-versus-accuracy contrast was significant for all 
four forms of perceived superiority, as well as for all four types of 
item (see Table 2, Control-versus-accuracy rows). Compared with 
the levels of perceived superiority evident in the control condition, 
participants with accuracy goals exhibited reliably reduced per- 
ceived superiority. In fact, participants in the accuracy condition 
exhibited negative inferiority, reporting more negative thoughts 
regarding their own relationships than other relationships, F(1, 
222) = 9.54, p < .01 (see means in Table 1 under Accuracy 
instructions condition). 8 
Hypothesis 3: Associations of commitment level with perceived 
superiority. Hypothesis 3a predicted that commitment would be 
positively associated with perceived superiority. As expected, the 
Target X Valence X Commitment interaction was significant (see 
Table 2 under Is Perceived Superiority Differentially Evident as a 
Function of Commitment Level and Experimental Condition?). 
Also, tests of simple effects revealed that the commitment effect 
s Given that participants in the control condition reliably exhibited 
greater perceived superiority than those in the accuracy condition, readers 
may wonder whether levels of perceived superiority differed for the threat 
and control conditions. Although this contrast is not orthogonal to the two 
planned comparisons, we conducted exploratory analyses to address this 
issue. These analyses revealed that the threat-versus-control contrast was 
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Table 3 
Associations of Commitment Level With Perceived Superiority as a Function of Experimental Condition: Study 1 
Predicting perceived superiority 
Threat vs. Control vs. 
Threat Control Accuracy Other Accuracy 
condition (/3) condition (/3) condition (/3) conditions (F) condition (F) 
Total perceived superiority 
Positive superiority 
Negative superiority 
Own relationship ositivity 
Other relationships negativity 
Positive items, own relationship 
Positive items, other elationships 
Negative items, own relationship 
Negative items, other elationships 
.61"* .37** .17 10.10"* 2.51 
.57** .25** .27* 6.32** 0.03 
.47** .37** .02 5.29* 6.11"* 
.60** .33** .20t 8.87** 0.88 
.55** .38** .10 7.37** 4.06* 
.46** .19" .19 4.30* 0.00 
-.50** -.24** -.30* 3.00t 0.19 
-.41"* -.32** -.09 2.64 2.19 
.39** .32** -.04 4.15" 5.82* 
Note. Values under Threat, Control, and Accuracy conditions are standardized coefficients reflecting the association of commitment with each effect. 
Values under Threat vs. Other conditions indicate whether the commitment-superiority association differs for the threat condition in comparison to other 
conditions; values under Control vs. Accuracy conditions indicate whether this association differs for the control and accuracy conditions. Table values are 
from six-factor analyses including two within-participant variables (item target and item valence) and four between-participant variables (experimental 
condition, gender, task order, and commitment). For all analyses, df = 1,222. 
tp  < .10 (marginally significant). *p < .05. **p < .01. 
was significant for all four forms of superiority, as well as for all 
four types of item (see means in Table 1). Thus, the more com- 
mitted individuals are, the more they are inclined to regard their 
relationships as superior to others' relationships; this inclination is 
considerably weaker among low-commitment i dividuals (individ- 
uals with extremely low commitment actually regard their own 
relationships as inferior). 
Beyond this, we suggested that if we are to conclude that commit- 
ment motivates uperior beliefs, we must demonstrate that the 
commitment-superiority association can be turned on and off--that 
the the strength of this association varies as a function of instructional 
set. As expected, the Target x Valence X Condition X Commitment 
effect was significant (see Table 2). For the three-group condition 
effect, we have two degrees of freedom available for planned con- 
trasts. To test Hypotheses 3b and 3c we (a) compared the strength of 
the commitment-superiority association i  the threat condition with 
that evident in the control and accuracy conditions and (b) compared 
the strength of the commitment-superiority association i  the control 
condition with that evident in the accuracy condition. The results of 
these analyses are summarized in Table 2, but are more easily inter- 
preted in Table 3, which displays (a) coefficients representing the 
commitment-superiority association for each experimental condition, 
along with (b) contrasts comparing the strength of the commitment- 
superiority association for the above-noted comparisons. 
Hypothesis 3b suggested that if the motivational properties of 
commitment are particularly active under conditions of threat, we 
should find that the commitment-superiority association is stron- 
ger among participants who receive psychologically threatening 
instructions than among those who receive control or accuracy 
instructions. As expected, the Target x Valence x Threat-Versus- 
Other-Conditions Contrast x Commitment interaction was signif- 
significant for all four forms of perceived superiority, Fs(l, 222) = 
from 5.48 to 22.39, all ps < .05, as well as for all types of item except 
positive items for other elationships, Fs(1,222) = from 4.50 to !6.98, all 
ps < .05. (For all effects, contrasts of the accuracy and threat conditions 
were significant, all ps < .01.) 
icant (see Table 3, Total perceived superiority represents the 
Target x Valence interaction, F[1,222] = 10.10, p < .01). Tests 
of simple effects revealed that the Threat-Versus-Other-Conditions 
Contrast x Commitment interaction was significant for all four 
forms of perceived superiority; this effect was significant or mar- 
ginal for positive items describing one's own relationship, ositive 
items describing others' relationships, and negative items describ- 
ing others' relationships (see Table 3). Thus, the association of 
commitment with perceived superiority is particularly strong under 
conditions of psychological threat. 
Hypothesis 3c suggested that to the degree that accuracy goals 
limit the impact of motivational forces, we should fred that the 
commitment-superiority association is weaker among participants 
who receive accuracy instructions than among those who receive 
control instructions. Although the Target X Valence X Control- 
Versus-Accuracy Contrast X Commitment interaction was not 
significant (see Table 3, F[1, 222] = 2.51, p < .11), the 
commitment-superiority association was descriptively weaker in 
the accuracy condition than in the control condition (only three of 
nine coefficients were marginal or significant in the accuracy 
condition). These associations differed significantly in three of 
nine instances--for negative superiority, other relationships neg- 
ativity, and negative items describing other relationships (see 
Table 3). It is interesting that compared with the control condition, 
accuracy weakened the tendency of committed individuals to 
report negative thoughts regarding others' relationships, uggest- 
ing that the inclination to hold negative beliefs about others' 
relationships may be an important means by which committed 
individuals typically achieve superior beliefs. 9
9 Given that the commitment-superiority association was stronger in the 
control condition than in the accuracy condition for three of nine contrasts, 
readers may wonder whether this association differed for the threat and 
control conditions. Although this contrast is not orthogonal to the two 
planned comparisons, we conducted exploratory analyses to address this 
issue. These analyses revealed that the Threat-Versus-Control Contrast x 
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Hypothesis 3d: Unique predictive power of commitment beyond 
evaluations of specific relationship attributes. We reasoned that 
if strong commitment motivates superior beliefs, then commitment 
should account for unique variance in perceived superiority be- 
yond the "objective quality" of a relationship. To test Hypothesis 
3d, we examined the commitment-superiority association control- 
ling for participants' evaluations of specific relationship attributes, 
including such attributes as sexual gratification, similarity of atti- 
tudes, mutual support, and partner physical attractiveness. Specif- 
ically, we replicated the above-reported 6-factor analysis, perform- 
ing a 7-factor analysis that included relationship-attribute ratings 
as a covariate. 
As would be anticipated, the effect of relationship-attribute 
ratings was significant or marginal for positive superiority, nega- 
tive superiority, own relationship ositivity, and other relation- 
ships negativity, Fs(1,220) = from 3.46 to 14.43, all ps < .06, as 
well as for positive items describing others' relationships, negative 
items describing one's own relationship, and negative items de- 
scribing others' relationships, Fs(1,220) = from 3.82 to 16.29, all 
ps < .05. Participants described their own relationships more 
favorably and described others' relationships less favorably to the 
extent hat they believed that their relationships possessed more 
desirable attributes. 
At the same time, and consistent with Hypothesis 3d, virtually 
all of the effects described earlier for the 6-factor analysis were 
replicated in the 7-factor analysis including relationship attribute 
ratings as a covariate. In every instance, patterns of significance 
versus nonsignificance w re identical to those reported in Table 2. 
For example, the Target × Valence × Condition interaction was 
significant in both the 6-factor, F(2, 222) = 37.65, p < .01, and 
7-factor, F(2, 220) = 32.88, p < .01, analyses, as were the 
Target × Valence × Commitment interaction, F(1,222) = 54.38, 
p < .01, and F(1,220) = 24.39, p < .01, for the 6- and 7-factor 
analyses, respectively, and the Target × Valence × Condition × 
Commitment interaction, F(2, 222) = 5.55, p < .01, and F(2, 
220) = 5.67, p < .01, for the 6- and 7-factor analyses, respec- 
tively. As in the 6-factor analyses reported in Table 2, the 7-factor 
analyses revealed that the Condition effect was significant for all 
four forms of perceived superiority, Fs(2, 220) = from 24.50 
to 31.41, all ps < .01. In addition, the Commitment effect was 
significant for all four forms of perceived SUperiority, Fs(1,220) = 
from 8.49 to 24.35, all ps < .01, as was the Condition × Com- 
mitment interaction, Fs(2, 220) = from 3.24 to 5.06, all ps < .05. 
Additional findings. Several additional effects from the 
6-factor analysis should be mentioned, although they are not 
directly hypothesis relevant. First, the item target main effect was 
signific ant, F(1,222) = 241.18, p < .01-  on average, participants 
Commitment interaction was significant or marginal for total superiority, 
positive superiority, own relationship ositivity, other elationships nega- 
tivity, positive items describing one's own relationship; and positive items 
describing others' relationships, Fs(1,222) = from 3.49 to 6.02, all ps < 
.06. The Threat-Versus-Control C ntrast × Commitment interaction was 
nonsignificant for negative superiority, negative items describing one's 
own relationship, and negative items describing others' relationships, Fs(l, 
222) = from 0.29 to 1.95, all ns. (For all effects, commitment-superiority 
associations inthe accuracy and threat conditions differed significantly, all 
ps < .01.) 
reported more thoughts about their own relationships than about 
others' relationships ( ee Table 2). Second, the item valence main 
effect was significant, F(1,222) = 54.20, p < .01--on average, 
participants reported a greater number of positive than negative 
thoughts (see Table 2). Third, the Valence × Commitment inter- 
action was significant, F(1,222) = 6.06, p < .01--on average, the 
above-noted valence effect was stronger for high-commitment 
individuals than for low-commitment i dividuals. 
In addition, the 6-factor analysis revealed significant results for 
several effects involving gender. The main effect of gender was 
significant, F(1, 222) = 7.94, p < .01, as were the Gender × 
Target × Valence interaction, F(1, 222) = 3.94, p < .05, the 
Sex × Target × Valence × Condition interaction, F(1, 
222) = 3.71, p < .03, and the Sex × Target × Valence × 
Commitment interaction, F(1,222) = 3.84, p < .05. Women listed 
a greater number of thoughts than men, exhibited greater overall 
tendencies toward perceived superiority, and the commitment- 
superiority association was stronger among women than among 
men. At the same time, all of the earlier-noted effects were 
significant for both women and men. Finally, out of a total of 24 
possible effects involving task order (positive vs. negative 
thoughts listed first), only one effect was significant. 
Discussion 
Study 1 revealed good support for Hypothesis 1, revealing 
evidence of all four forms of perceived superiority individuals 
had more good things to say about their own relationships than 
about others' relationships (positive superiority), fewer bad things 
to say about their own relationships than about others' relation- 
ships (negative superiority), more good than bad things to say 
about their own relationships (own relationship ositivity), and 
more bad than good things to say about others' relationships (other 
relationships negativity). Also, Hypotheses 2a and 2b received 
good support. Tendencies toward perceived superiority consis- 
tently were strongest under conditions of psychological threat and 
consistently were weakest given accuracy goals. Indeed, in the 
accuracy condition, individuals displayed negative inferiority, re- 
porting more negative thoughts for their own than for others' 
relationships. 
In the control condition in which we assess "normal" inclina- 
tions toward superior beliefs--participants evidenced intermediate 
levels of perceived superiority. Participants in the control condi- 
tion exhibited reliably more superior beliefs than not only those in 
the accuracy condition but also that which is attributable to eval- 
uations of specific relationship attributes. Thus, it seems safe to 
conclude that the amount of perceived superiority observed under 
normal circumstances reflects a good deal of illusion, in that levels 
of perceived superiority exceed that which (a) is attributable tothe 
objective quality of a relationship and (b) is evident when partic- 
ipants try to be accurate. 
In addition, Study 1 revealed good support for Hypothesis 3a, in 
that commitment was positively associated with perceived superi- 
ority. Importantly, and consistent with Hypothesis 3b, the 
commitment-superiority association was more pronounced among 
participants who received psychologically threatening instructions 
than among those who received control or accuracy instructions. 
And in partial support of Hypothesis 3c, the commitment- 
superiority association tended to be weaker among participants 
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who received accuracy instructions than among those who re- 
ceived control instructions. These interaction effects do much to 
support our claims regarding the motivational properties of com- 
mitment. Also, and consistent with Hypothesis 3d, commitment 
consistently accounted for unique variance in perceived superiority 
beyond evaluations of specific relationship attributes (beyond an 
index of reality). In combination with support for Hypotheses 3b 
and 3c, these results are consistent with our characterization f the 
role of commitment in motivating perceived superiority and are 
compatible with the assumption that committed individuals need to 
perceive their relationships in a positive light; in low-commitment 
relationships this need is appreciably weaker. (Indeed, as relation- 
ships deteriorate, individuals may exhibit "perceived inferiority" 
out of a need to justify terminating their involvements.) Thus, 
Study 1 revealed relatively good support for hypotheses regarding 
the motivational properties of perceived superiority. 
Study 2 
Study 2 used data from two research occasions of a longitudinal 
study of married partners. As in Study 1, Hypothesis 1predicts that 
individuals will exhibit all four forms of perceived superiority. 
Relevant o the proposition that commitment plays a role in mo- 
tivating illusion, Hypothesis 3a predicts that commitment will be 
positively associated with perceived superiority. In addition, given 
that in Study 2 we obtained ata from both partners in marital 
relationships, we examined the relative levels of perceived supe- 
riority exhibited by both the more and less committed partner, 
reasoning that if commitment motivates perceived superiority, 
within a given relationship the more committed partner should 
exhibit greater perceived superiority (Hypothesis 3e). 
Moreover, in Study 2 we obtained evidence to shed light on the 
extent to which the perceived superiority of one's own relationship 
serves a self-enhancing function in addition to (or in lieu of) a 
relationship-enhancing function. To the extent that committed 
individuals develop collective representations of the self, yielding 
some degree of self-other merger, it seems plausible that the need 
to regard the self as superior might yield tendencies to regard the 
relationship as superior. Thus, in addition to measuring commit- 
ment level (the presumed relationship-enhancing motivator of il- 
lusion), we also measured self-esteem, a frequently examined 
motivator of self-enhancing illusion (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
We reasoned that if self-esteem otivates the perceived superior- 
ity of one's own relationship, associations with commitment 
should decline considerably (or drop to nonsignificance) when we 
include self-esteem as a predictor of this criterion. On the basis of 
the assumption that commitment plays a central role in motivating 
perceived superiority, we anticipated that commitment would ac- 
count for substantial unique variance beyond self-esteem (Hypoth- 
esis 3f). 
Study 2 also examined the claim that perceived superiority 
serves a functional purpose, representing a habit of thought hat 
supports couple well-being. Hypothesis 4 predicts that earlier 
perceived superiority will predict later couple well-being, opera- 
tionally defined in terms of increases over time in dyadic adjust- 
ment (Hypothesis 4a) and persistence (Hypothesis 4b). In addition, 
we reasoned that if superior beliefs serve a functional purpose, 
representing a mechanism by which committed individuals sustain 
healthy relationships, then perceived superiority will partially me- 
diate the association of commitment with dyadic adjustment (Hy- 
pothesis 4c). We predicted partial rather than complete mediation, 
because there are multiple mechanisms by which committed indi- 
viduals sustain their involvements, including not only perceived 
superiority but also such maintenance acts as accommodation, 
sacrifice, and derogation of alternatives. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 63 married heterosexual couples who 
volunteered totake part in a 6-wave longitudinal study of marital relation- 
ships. (This study is part of a larger project concerned with quality of 
couple functioning in marital relationships [cf. Rusbnlt, Bissonnette, Ar- 
riaga, & Cox, 1998].) ~° A total of 123 couples participated in the project. 
Data for the present research are based on 63 couples who completed 
research activities at Time 2 of the study. Some analyses also make use of 
Time 5 data for these couples; Times 2 and 5 were separated by roughly 20 
months. At Time 2, participants were 31.80 years old on average. All 
participants had completed high school (40% had bachelor's degrees, 32% 
had graduate degrees), their personal annual salary was around $29,000, 
and most were Caucasian (4% African American, 3% Asian American, 
91% Caucasian, 2% Latino). At Time 2, partners had been married for an 
average of 15.40 months; 11% had been married previously. 
Procedure. The study is a lagged longitudinal design: Couples joined 
the study at different times, but over the course of the study they engaged 
in parallel activities at a parallel pace, completing research activities at 
approximately 6-month intervals. Participants completed the University of 
North Carolina (UNC) Marriage Questionnaire ateach research occasion. 
At Times 1, 3, and 5, participants were sent questionnaires that were 
returned through the mail; at Times 2, 4, and 6, participants were sent 
questionnaires that were returned at laboratory sessions. Partners were 
asked to complete their questionnaires independently and not to speak to 
one another about heir answers. Although some variables were measured 
at all six occasions, other variables differed over time. Given that perceived 
superiority was measured only at Time 2 and Time 5, the present study 
focuses mainly on Time 2 data; Time 5 data are used to examine change 
over time in model variables. At the end of each research occasion, couples 
were partially debriefed, reminded of upcoming activities, paid, and 
thanked for their assistance. Couples were paid $40 for participation i  
Time 2 laboratory sessions and $25 for completing Time 5 mailed 
questionnaires. 
Time 2 and Time 5 questionnaires measured commitment level using 
versions of the Study 1 items that are suitable for marital relationships 
(Time 2 and Time 5 ~t = .82 and .83). Couple well-being was assessed 
using the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (Spanier, 1976). This 32-item instru- 
ment includes Likert, checklist, and dichotomous item formats. Given that 
1o Data from this study were also used in (a) Arriaga and Rusbult (1998; 
Study 1), which examined the association of accommodation with partner 
perspective taking; (b) Bissonnette, Rusbult, and Kilpatrick (1997), which 
examined the associations among commitment, empathic accuracy, and 
accommodation; (c) Ddgotas, Rusbult, and Verette (1999; Study 2), which 
examined the association of mutuality of commitment with couple well- 
being; (d) Drigotas, Rusbult, Wieselquist, and Whitton (1999; Study 4), 
which examined the association of partner affirmation with couple well- 
being; (e) Gaines et al. (1997; Study 4), which examined the association of
attachment style with accommodation; (f) Rusbult, Bissonnette, Arriaga, 
and Cox (1998), which examined the association of accommodation with 
both commitment and couple well-being; (g) Van Lunge et al. (1997; Study 
6), which examined the association of commitment with willingness to 
sacrifice; and (h) Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, and Agnew (1999; Study 2), 
which examined the associations among commitment, accommodation, 
and trust. 
PERCEIVED SUPERIORITY 
Table 4 
Mean Number of Thoughts as a Function of Item Target, Item Valence, Commitment Level, 
Relative Commitment Level, Dyadic Adjustment, and Persistence: Study 2 
Positive item valence Negative item valence 
Own Other Own Other 
Condition relationship relationships relationship relationships 
High vs. Low commitment 
High commitment 6.15 0.45 0.45 3.48 
Low commitment 4.39 0.97 1.61 1.50 
High vs. Low Relative commitment 
More committed partner 5.75 0.69 0.9t 3.00 
Less committed partner 4.78 0.86 1.39 2.12 
High vs. Low dyadic adjustment 
High dyadic adjustment 6.75 0.07 0.28 3.76 
Low dyadic adjustment 4.13 1.37 1.74 1.44 
Later relationship status 
Relationship ersisted 5.60 0.71 0.91 2.71 
Relationship ended 3.17 0.83 2.01) 1.25 
Note. Table values reflect number of thoughts listed. The predicted means for commitment and dyadic 
adjustment were conditioned at values of one standard eviation above and below the mean of each variable 
(Aiken & West, 1991). 
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commitment is a key variable in our work, we dropped items that might be 
relevant to this construct to yield a commitment-purged measure of adjust- 
ment that tapped qualifies of well-being such as intimacy, agreement, 
effective problem solving, and shared activities (Time 2 and Time 5 a = 
.89 and .91). 1 ~ Time 2 questionnaires measured self-esteem using a 17-item 
version of Hoyle's (1991) instrument (e.g., "On the whole, I am satisfied 
with myself"; for each item, 0 = do not agree at all, 8 = agree completely; 
Time 2 ct = .93). We measured perceived superiority using the same 
general method as we used in Study 1. However, the thought-listing 
procedure was not timed--participants were given as much time as they 
wanted to list positive and negative f atures of relationships. As in Study 1, 
trained undergraduate research assistants later scored participants' lists, 
recording the number of positive and negative thoughts listed for own and 
other relationships. Study 2 measures were relatively stable over time: 
Significant test-retest correlations were observed for Time 2 and Time 5 
measures of commitment and dyadic adjustment, for number of positive 
thoughts regarding own and other elationships, and for number of negative 
thoughts regarding one's own and others' relationships (respective rs = 
.79, .87, .51, .70, .59, and .45, all ps < .01). 
Results 
We performed a series of hierarchical linear modeling analyses 
to test predictions associated with Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992). Our design includes three levels of variable: 
(a) positive versus negative thoughts regarding own and others' 
relationships are nested in (b) male and female partners, who are 
nested in (c) couples. To develop hierarchical linear models with 
two levels of predictor variable, we calculated a series of within- 
participant scores to represent main effects and interactions involv- 
ing item target and item valence. 12 We initially performed all 
analyses including gender as a lower level variable; if no main 
effects or interactions involving this variable were significant, 
gender was dropped from the model. Table 4 presents the mean 
number of thoughts listed as a function of item valence, item 
target, commitment level, relative commitment level, dyadic ad- 
justment, and later relationship status (degrees of freedom vary 
across analyses because of missing data). Means for commitment 
and dyadic adjustment were conditioned at values of one standard 
deviation above and below the means for these variables (Aiken & 
West, 1991). Table 5 summarizes the results of key analyses. 
Hypothesis 1: Existence and form of perceived superiority. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants would exhibit perceived 
superiority. In the hierarchical linear model designed to test this 
prediction, we regressed perceived superiority scores onto one 
lower level variable (gender), with couple as the upper level unit. 
As expected, the Item Target × Item Valence interaction was 
significant (see Table 5 under Is Perceived Superiority Evident?). 
11 Our commitment-purged measure of adjustment dropped the follow- 
ing items from the Dyadic Adjustment Scale: "How often do you discuss 
or have you considered ending your relationship?"; "How often do you 
discuss or have you considered ivorce, separation, or terminating your 
relationship?"; "Do you ever regret hat you married?"; and the 6-option 
item, "Which of the following statements best describes how you feel about 
the future of your relationship?... I want desperately for my relationship 
to succeed and would go to almost any length to see that it does" (there are 
an additional five options for this item). 
12 For simple analyses it would be possible to test our hypotheses in
three-level models, including within-participant variables as lower level 
variables (item valence and target) and including within-couple variables 
as middle level variables (gender, commitment), with couple as the upper 
level unit. However, for analyses in which perceived superiority is repre- 
sented as a predictor variable, three-level models become considerably 
more complex, in that they involve representing within-participant vari- 
ables (item valence and target) as predictors (this becomes particularly 
complex in residualized lagged analyses). The approach we adopted is 
appropriate in that (a) our within-participant scores yield findings for 
two-level models that are conceptually equivalent to those obtained in 
parallel three-level models, (b) this approach yields a set of within- 
participant perceived superiority scores that are substantively meaningful, 
and (c) we also present findings for the "finest" level of analysis, reporting 
effects for the four within-participant items on which our within-participant 
scores are based (i.e., it will be evident which components ofthe perceived 
superiority phenomenon account for a given effect). 
534 RUSBULT ET AL. 
Table 5 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table: Study 2 
Effect F df p< 
Is Perceived Superiority Evident? 
Full model 
Item target main effect 54.02 1, 61 .01 
Item valence main effect 69.89 1, 61 .01 
Target X Valence interaction 73.44 1, 61 .01 
Tests of simple effects 
Positive superiority 115.56 1, 61 .01 
Negative superiority 17.80 1, 61 .01 
Own relationship ositivity 107.95 1, 61 .01 
Other relationships negativity 26.01 1, 61 .01 
Is Commitment Associated With Perceived Superiority? 
Full model 
Target × Valence × Commitment 
Tests of simple effects 
Positive Superiority × Commitment 
Negative Superiority x Commitment 
Own Relationship Positivity × Commitment 
Other Relationships Negativity X Commitment 
Positive Items for Own Relationship x Commitment 
Positive Items for Other Relationships × Commitment 
Negative Items for Own Relationship x Commitment 
Negative Items for Other Relationships X Commitment 
25.40 1, 51 .01 
11.61 1, 51 .0t 
26.30 1, 51 .01 
20.56 1, 51 .01 
19.80 1, 51 .01 
8.29 1, 51 .01 
4.65 1, 51 .04 
18.13 1, 51 .01 
16.61 1, 51 .01 
Does the More Committed Partner Exhibit Greater Perceived Superiority Than the Less Committed Partner? 
Full model 
Target X Valence × Relative Commitment 7.86 1, 46 .01 
Tests of simple effects 
Positive Superiority x Relative Commitment 3.62 1, 46 .06 
Negative Superiority X Relative Commitment 7.58 1, 46 .01 
Own Relationship Positivity x Relative Commitment 6.40 i, 46 .01 
Other Relationships Negativity X Relative Commitment 6.13 1, 46 .02 
Positive Items for Own Relationship X Relative Commitment 3.28 1, 46 .08 
Positive Items for Other Relationships × Relative Commitment 3.39 1, 46 .07 
Negative Items for Own Relationship × Relative Commitment 0.61 1, 46 .44 
Negative Items for Other Relationships × Relative Commitment 5.57 1, 46 .02 
Is Perceived Superiority Associated With Dyadic Adjustment? 
Full model 
Target × Valence interaction 
Tests of simple effects 
Positive Superiority × Adjustment 
Negative Superiority × Adjustment 
Own Relationship Positivity x Adjustment 
Other Relationships Negativity × Adjustment 
Positive Items for Own Relationship × Adjustment 
Positive Items for Other Relationships × Adjustment 
Negative Items for Own Relationship × Adjustment 
Negative Items for Other Relationships × Adjustment 
45.14 1, 47 .01 
31.47 1, 47 .01 
26.93 1, 47 .01 
35.76 1, 47 .01 
34.02 1, 47 .0t 
22.44 1, 47 .01 
16.40 1, 47 ,01 
15.74 1, 47 .01 
18.16 1, 47 .01 
Is Perceived Superiority Associated With Later Relationship Status (Relationship Persisted vs. Ended)? 
Full model 
Target X Valence interaction 
Tests of simple effects 
Positive Superiority x Later Status 
Negative Superiority x Later Status 
Own Relationship Positivity x Later Status 
Other Relationships Negativity X Later Status 
Positive Items for Own Relationship × Later Status 
Positive Items for Other Relationships X Later Status 
Negative Items for Own Relationship × Later Status 
Negative Items for Other Relationships × Later Status 
4.97 1, 51 .03 
3.94 1, 51 .05 
4.34 1, 51 .04 
7.97 1, 51 .01 
1.71 I, 51 .20 
5.16 1, 51 .03 
0.02 l, 51 .88 
4.20 1, 51 .05 
2.44 1, 51 .12 
Note. Table values are Fs from hierarchical linear modeling analyses including one or more lower level 
variables (sex, other predictor variables), with couple as the upper level unit. 
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Tests of simple effects revealed good support for all four forms of 
perceived superiority (see Table 5 under Tests of simple effects). 
Participants exhibited positive superiority, negative superiority, 
own relationship positivity, and other elationships negativity (see 
means in Table 4). 
Three additional effects should be mentioned, although they are 
not directly hypothesis relevant. First, the item target main effect 
was significant--on average, participants reported more thoughts 
about heir own relationships than about others' relationships ( ee 
Table 5). Second, the item valence main effect was signifi- 
cant_on average, participants reported a greater number of pos- 
itive than negative thoughts. Third, the Gender X Target X Va- 
lence interaction was significant, F(1, 61) = 5.06, p < .03 I
women exhibited greater levels of perceived superiority than men. 
At the same time, tendencies toward perceived superiority were 
significant for both women and men. 
Hypothesis 3a: Association of commitment with perceived su- 
periority. Hypothesis 3a predicted that commitment would be 
positively associated with tendencies toward perceived superiority. 
In the model designed to test this prediction, we regressed per- 
ceived superiority scores onto one lower level variable (commit- 
ment; initial analyses revealed no significant effects involving 
gender), with couple as the upper level unit. As expected, the 
Target X Valence × Commitment interaction was significant (see 
Table 5 under Is Commitment Associated with Perceived Superi- 
ority?). Also, tests of simple ffects revealed that the commitment 
effect was significant for all four forms of perceived superiority, as 
well as for all four types of item--for positive and negative items 
listed for one's own and others' relationships ( ee means in Ta- 
ble 4 under High versus Low commitment). 
Does earlier commitment predict later perceived superiority or 
change over time in perceived superiority? We do not have suffi- 
cient statistical power to examine these associations (df for lagged 
analyses = 1, 16; df for residualized lagged analyses = 1, 14), 
because (a) we began measuring perceived superiority midway 
into the project (many early participants did not complete superi- 
ority measures at Times 2 or 5), (b) we added this component to
Time 5 procedures before adding it to Time 2 procedures, and (c) 
some couples who completed superiority measures at Time 2 were 
separated by Time 5. We performed exploratory analyses in which 
we regressed later superiority scores onto (a) earlier commitment 
and gender and (b) earlier superiority scores, earlier commitment, 
and gender (with couple as the upper level unit). As would be 
anticipated given our low power, the results of these analyses were 
weak: The lagged analyses revealed that earlier commitment was 
negatively associated with negative thoughts regarding one's own 
relationship, and the residualized lagged analyses revealed no 
support for predictions. 
Hypothesis 3e: Levels of perceived superiority among the more 
and less committed partner in a given relationship. Given that 
we obtained ata from both partners in each marriage, we were 
able to examine tendencies toward superiority exhibited by both 
the more and the less committed partner within each relationship. 
Essentially, these analyses use the relationship as a control vari- 
able. If more and less committed partners exhibit differential 
tendencies toward superiority, such findings would support our 
claim that commitment motivates uperior beliefs. Of course, 
partners do not experience precisely the same relationshitr--the 
many components of a relationship may differ in salience for the 
two partners, and whereas the male experiences the female as a 
partner, the female xperiences the male as a partner. Nevertheless, 
to the degree that partners arguably experience a similar elation- 
ship, the more committed partner should exhibit greater perceived 
superiority. 
To test Hypothesis 3e, we used measures of self-reported com- 
mitment to identify the more and less committed partner in each 
relationship. We regressed perceived superiority scores onto one 
lower level variable (relative commitment; initial analyses re- 
vealed no significant effects involving ender), with couple as the 
upper level unit. As expected, the Target X Valence X Relative 
Commitment interaction was significant (see Table 5 under Does 
the More Committed Partner Exhibit Greater Superiority Than the 
Less Committed Partner?). Also, tests of simple effects revealed 
that he relative commitment effect was significant or marginal for 
all four forms of perceived superiority, as well as for all types of 
item except negative items for own relationship (see means in 
Table 4 under High versus Low relative commitment). 
Hypothesis 3f." Commitment level and self-esteem aspredictors 
of perceived superiority. Is the perceived superiority of one's 
own relationship a relationship-enhancing phenomenon r is it a 
self-enhancing phenomenon? To the extent hat self-esteem oti- 
vates the perceived superiority of one's own relationship, we 
should find that self-esteem predicts this criterion as well as or 
better than commitment level. To explore this line of reasoning, we 
performed concurrent analyses using Time 2 data. Table 6 presents 
(a) the simple association of commitment and self-esteem with 
each superiority measure (each predictor, in turn, was represented 
as a lower level variable; couple was the upper level unit) and (b) 
the associations of commitment and self-esteem with perceived 
superiority in two-factor analyses (commitment and self-esteem 
were lower level variables; couple was the upper level unit). 
The simple association ofself-esteem with perceived superiority 
was significant for total superiority as well as for all four forms of 
superiority and was significant or marginal for three of four types 
of item (see Table 6 under Simple associations). The simple 
association of commitment with superiority was .36 on average, 
whereas the simple association of self-esteem with superiority was 
.20 on average. (The simple association of commitment with 
self-esteem was .15, F[1, 57] = 4.91, p < .03.) The two-factor 
analyses revealed that when commitment and self-esteem were 
simultaneously regressed onto each superiority measure, both 
commitment level and self-esteem tended to account for signifi- 
cant variance in perceived superiority. Associations with commit- 
ment were descriptively stronger than were associations with self- 
esteem: In two-factor analyses, the commitment-superiority 
association was .32 on average, whereas the self-esteem- 
superiority association was .16 on average. Thus, and consistent 
with our characterization f perceived superiority as a relationship- 
enhancing phenomenon, commitment consistently accounts for 
substantial unique variance beyond self-esteem. At the same time, 
it appears that self-esteem ay also play a role--albeit a descrip- 
tively weaker ole--in motivating this phenomenon. 
Hypothesis 4a: Association of perceived superiority with dyadic 
adjustment. Hypothesis 4a predicted that if perceived superiority 
serves a functional purpose for relationships, then perceived supe- 
riority should be positively associated with dyadic adjustment. In 
the model designed to test this prediction, we regressed yadic 
adjustment onto lower level perceived superiority scores (there 
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Table 6 
Associations of Commitment Level and Self-Esteem With Perceived Superiority-- 
Simple Associations and Simultaneous Regression Analyses: Study 2 
Simple associations Regression coefficients 
Commitment Self- Commitment Self- 
Predicting perceived superiority level esteem level esteem 
Total perceived superiority .44** .22** .40** .17" 
Positive superiority .32** .17" .28** .14t 
Negative superiority .45** .23** .41"* .17" 
Own relationship positivity .41"* .20* .37** .16' 
Other relationships negativity .40** .21"* .35** .16" 
Positive items for own relationship .28** .10 .25** .08 
Positive items for other elationships -.38** -.27** -.33** -.23** 
Negative items for own relationship -.20* -.21"* -.16 -.21"* 
Negative items for other elationships .37** .15t .34** .09 
Note. Simple associations = simple association of each predictor with each form of superiority; Regression 
coefficients = values from analyses in which each form of superiority was simultaneously regressed onto 
commitment and self-esteem. For analyses examining simple associations with commitment level, df --- 1, 51; 
for analyses examining simple associations with self-esteem, df= 1, 52; for simultaneous regression analyses, 
df = 1,48. 
tp  < .10 (marginally significant). *p < .05. **p < .01. 
were no significant effects involving gender), with couple as the 
upper level unit. The results of concurrent analyses are summa- 
rized in Table 5, but are more easily interpreted in Table 7, which 
displays regression coefficients representing the superiority- 
adjustment association for each form of superiority. As expected, 
the concurrent Target × Valence × Adjustment interaction was 
significant (see Table 7 under Concurrent adjustment; Total per- 
ceived superiority represents the Target × Valence interaction). 
Also, tests of simple effects revealed that the concurrent 
superiority-adjustment association was significant for all four 
forms of perceived superiority, as well as for all four types of 
item--for positive and negative items listed for one's own and 
others' relationships. 13 
Does earlier superiority predict later dyadic adjustment? In the 
model examining simple lagged associations, we regressed later 
adjustment onto earlier superiority scores (there were no signifi- 
cant effects involving ender; couple was the upper level unit). As 
expected, the Target × Valence × Later Adjustment interaction 
was significant (see Table 7 under Later adjustment). Also, tests of 
simple effects revealed that the superiority-adjustment association 
was significant for all four forms of superiority as well as for all 
four types of item. 
Does earlier superiority predict change over time in adjustment? 
In the model examining change in adjustment, we regressed later 
adjustment scores onto earlier adjustment and superiority scores 
(there were no significant effects involving ender; couple was the 
upper level unit). These residualized lagged analyses revealed a
significant Target × Valence × Later Adjustment interaction (see 
Table 7 under Change in adjustment). Also, tests of simple effects 
revealed that the superiority-adjustment association was signifi- 
cant for negative superiority and own relationship ositivity, as 
well as for negative items regarding one's own relationship. Al- 
though findings from the residualized lagged analyses were not as 
strong as one ideally would like to see, it is important to recognize 
that residualized lagged analyses are a "tough test": (a) These 
analyses rest on adequate change in the criterion and (b) Time 2 
and Time 5 research occasions were separated by about 20 months. 
Thus, it is remarkable that in several instances--including, impor- 
tantly, total superiority--earlier perceived superiority predicted 
increases over time in adjustment. 
Hypothesis 4b: Association of perceived superiority with later 
relationship status. Hypothesis 4b predicted that earlier superi- 
ority would be greater among couples whose relationships per- 
sisted over time than among couples whose relationships later 
terminated. In the model designed to test this prediction, we 
regressed perceived superiority scores onto later relationship status 
(there were no significant effects involving ender; couple was the 
upper level unit). As expected, the Target × Valence interaction 
was significant, as were the effects for positive superiority, nega- 
tive superiority, own relationship positivity, and both positive and 
negative items for one's own relationship (see Table 5 under Is 
13 It has been argued that he functional value of illusion may be limited 
when such tendencies are excessive and that there may be an optimal, 
mid-range region for illusion (cf. Baumeister, 1989; Colvin & Block, 
1994). To explore the possibility of a nonlinear association of perceived 
superiority with couple well-being, we regressed dyadic adjustment onto 
lower level linear and quadratic terms for perceived superiority, with 
couple as the upper level unit. For total superiority, the linear term was 
significant, F(1, 46) = 30.93, p < .01, and the quadratic term was 
marginal, F(1, 46) = 3.63, p < .06. A scatterplot revealed that increases in 
perceived superiority ield linear increases in adjustment up to a point, at 
which time there is an asymptote. Thus, the association of perceived 
superiority with adjustment is largely linear--generally speaking, more is 
better. At the same time, it is possible that if tendencies toward perceived 
superiority were to exceed the upper limit observed in our sample---which 
included generally well-functioning marriages--higher levels of perceived 
superiority might begin to yield negative consequences for couple well- 
being. 
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Table 7 
Associations of Perceived Superiority With Dyadic Adjustment: Study 2 
Concurrent Later Change in 
Predicting dyadic adjustment adjustment adjustment adjustment 
Total perceived superiority 
Positive superiority 
Negative superiority 
Own relationship positivity 
Other relationships negativity 
Positive items for own relationship 
Positive items for other elationships 
Negative items for own relationship 
Negative items for other elationships 
.45** .45** .16' 
.37** .37** .10 
.39** .32** .14" 
.42** .45** .19"* 
.31"* .33** .09 
.31"* .32** .08 
-.31"* -.39** -.10 
-.30** -.42** -.22** 
.30** .22** .06 
Note. Concurrent adjustment, later adjustment, and change in adjustment are standardized coefficients reflect- 
ing the association ofeach form of superiority with dyadic adjustment. Table values are from hierarchical linear 
modeling analyses including two or more lower level variables (sex, other predictor variables), with couple as 
the upper level unit. For concurrent analyses, df = 1, 47; for lagged analyses, df = 1, 34; for residualized lagged 
analyses, df = 1, 31. 
*p<.05.  **p<.01.  
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Perceived Superiority Associated x~ith Later Relationship Status?; 
see means in Table 4 under Later relationship status). TM 
Hypothesis 4c: Perceived superiority as a relationship mainte- 
nance mechanism. Does perceived superiority represent one of 
several mechanisms by which committed individuals ustain well- 
functioning relationships? If so, we should find that in mediation 
analyses (a) perceived superiority accounts for significant variance 
in adjustment beyond commitment and (b) the commitment- 
adjustment association is significantly weaker than in analyses 
examining the simple commitment-adjustment association (Baron 
& Kermy, 1986). To explore mediation, we performed concurrent 
analyses using Time 2 data. Table 8 presents (a) the simple 
association of commitment and each superiority measure with 
dyadic adjustment ( hese were reported in Table 5) and (b) the 
associations of commitment and superiority with adjustment in 
mediation analyses (commitment and perceived superiority mea- 
sures were lower level variables; couple was the upper level unit). 
As noted earlier, analyses examining simple associations with 
adjustment revealed that all nine superiority measures were sig- 
nificantly associated with adjustment. Also, commitment was sig- 
nificantly associated with adjustment (see Table 8 under Simple 
association). (There are nine forms of superiority, so we list simple 
associations for each form; there is just one measure of commit- 
ment, so we list just one association with this variable.) The 
mediation analyses revealed that perceived superiority consistently 
accounts for unique variance in adjustment beyond commitment 
(see Table 8, Perceived superiority, column under Mediation anal- 
yses). We anticipated that perceived superiority would partially 
mediate the association of commitment with dyadic adjustment. As 
anticipated, in mediation analyses, coefficients for commitment 
consistently were significant (see Table 8, Commitment level, 
column under Mediation analyses). Importantly, the commitment- 
adjustment associations in mediation analyses tended to be weaker 
than the simple commitment-adjustment associations--the simple 
commitment-adjustment association was .65, whereas in media- 
tion analyses the commitment-adjustment association was .55 on 
average. We performed tests to evaluate the significance of medi- 
ation, and found that in all nine instances, mediation was signifi- 
cant or marginal (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998; see Table 8, 
Significance of mediation column). Thus, and consistent with 
expectations, mediation of the commitment-adjustment associa- 
tion by perceived superiority was partial yet significant. 
Discussion 
Study 2 revealed good support for Hypothesis 1: Participants 
exhibited reliable tendencies toward perceived superiority, regard- 
ing their own relationships as both better than and not as bad as 
others' relationships. Study 2 also revealed good support for Hy- 
pothesis 3a: Concurrent analyses revealed consistent evidence of 
positive associations between commitment and perceived superi- 
ority. Lagged and residualized lagged analyses revealed little ev- 
idence of commitment-superiority associations, presumably be- 
cause these analyses were based on exceptionally small samples. 
Finally, Hypothesis 3e received good support: Within a given 
relationship, the more committed partner exhibited greater per- 
ceived superiority than the less committed partner. 
In Study 2, we also sought o determine whether the perceived 
superiority of one's own relationship serves a relationship- 
enhancing function or a self-enhancing function. Toward this goal, 
we pitted self-esteem against commitment level as predictors of 
perceived superiority. Consistent with Hypothesis 3f, these anal- 
yses revealed that commitment is a powerful predictor of per- 
ceived superiority, accounting for substantial unique variance in 
this criterion beyond variance attributable to self-esteem. At the 
same time, self-esteem tended to account for some unique variance 
in perceived superiority, suggesting that in addition to serving a 
14 This analysis is not the ideal means of examining associations with 
later elationship status, in that later status is a dichotomous variable and is 
represented in this model as predictor rather than as criterion. We repli- 
cated these analyses using logistic analysis, regressing later relationship 
status onto each couple's average superiority scores. These analyses rep- 
licated the results reported above, revealing significant effects for the 
Target x Valence interaction as well as for positive superiority, negative 
superiority, own relationship ositivity, and both positive and negative 
items for one's own relationship, X2(1, N = 54) = from 3.94 to 7.97, all 
ps < .05. 
538 RUSBULT ET AL. 
Table 8 
Associations of Commitment Level and Perceived Superiority With Dyadic Adjustment-- 
Simple Associations and Mediation Analyses: Study 2 
Simple 
Predicting dyadic adjustment association 
Mediation analyses 
Perceived Commitment Significance of 
(/3) superiority (/3) level (/3) mediation (z) 
Commitment level .65** 
Total perceived superiority .45** .31"* .50** 3.42** 
Positive superiority .37** .27** .55** 2.65** 
Negative superiority .39** .23** .53** 2.80** 
Own relationship positivity .42** .27** .53** 3.00** 
Other elationships negativity .31'* .29** .52** 3.06** 
Positive items for own relationship .31"* .20** .57** 2.09* 
Positive items for other elationships -.31"* -.27** .60** 1.89t 
Negative items for own relationship -.30** -.18'* .59** 2.24* 
Negative items for other elationships .30** .19"* .56** 2.25* 
Note. Simple association = simple association feach predictor with dyadic adjustment; Mediation analyses =
analyses in which dyadic adjustment was simultaneously regressed onto commitment along with each form of 
superiority. For analyses examining simple associations with perceived superiority, df = 1, 51; for the analysis 
examining the simple association with commitment, df = 1, 51; for mediation analyses, df = 1, 43. 
tp  < .10 (marginally significant). *p < .05. **p < .01. 
relationship-enhancing function, this phenomenon may also serve 
a self-enhancing function. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, perceived superiority consis- 
tently was positively associated with dyadic adjustment, in both 
concurrent and lagged analyses. Also, analyses examining overall 
levels of superiority (total superiority) revealed that earlier per- 
ceived superiority predicted increases over time in adjustment. 
Study 2 also revealed good support for Hypothesis 4b, in that 
earlier perceived superiority generally was greater among couples 
whose relationships ersisted than among couples whose relation- 
ships later terminated. Finally, mediation analyses revealed good 
support for Hypothesis 4c: (a) Perceived superiority consistently 
accounted for unique variance in adjustment beyond commitment, 
and (b) compared with the direct association of commitment with 
adjustment, his association was weaker (yet still significant) in 
mediation analyses. These findings are compatible with the asser- 
tion that perceived superiority represents one of several mecha- 
nisms by which committed individuals ustain well-functioning 
relationships. 
General Discussion 
In the introduction we advanced a functional analysis of per- 
ceived superiority, suggesting that this phenomenon is a relatively 
pervasive and adaptive pattern of thought. The emergence and 
persistence of perceived superiority is assumed to rest on its 
benefits to relationships. We argued that at least in part, perceived 
superiority reflects motivated processing, being driven by the need 
to perceive one's own relationship as superior. Moreover, we 
suggested that commitment plays a role in motivating perceived 
superiority. Below, we present evidence pertinent to these and 
other more specific assertions addressed in the present work. 
Existence and Motivational Properties of Perceived 
Superiority 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and the results of previous work 
(e.g., Buunk & Van Yperen, 1991; Van Lange & Rusbult, 1995), 
both studies revealed that individuals are inclined to regard their 
relationships as comparatively favored, exhibiting four forms of 
superior belief: positive superiority ("my relationship s better than 
others"), negative superiority ("my relationship is not as bad as 
others"), own relationship ositivity ("my relationship is more 
good than bad"), and other relationships negativity ("other ela- 
tionships are more bad than good"). Moreover, the tendency to- 
ward superior beliefs is evident across multiple indices of superi- 
ority. People not only hold a greater number of positive thoughts 
about heir own than about others' relationships, but those thoughts 
also tend to be quantitatively more favorable than thoughts regard- 
ing others' relationships (see Footnote 7), Thus, one does not 
experience one's relationships in a vacuum--the beliefs one holds 
about relationships are especially meaningful in relation to one's 
beliefs about others' relationships. 
This research also revealed good support for the claim that 
perceived superiority involves motivated processing. Hypothe- 
sis 2a suggested that the experience of psychological threat o the 
relationship would enhance tendencies toward perceived superior- 
ity. Study 1 revealed that compared with individuals operating 
under other instructional sets, those who experienced psycholog- 
ically threatening instructions--and were made to experience 
doubt regarding their relationships--exhibited exceptionally supe- 
rior beliefs. It is noteworthy that the effects of threat on belief 
systems were evident not only in relation to other instructional sets 
but also above and beyond variance attributable to participants' 
evaluations of specific relationship attributes. These findings are 
noteworthy in that although many theorists have argued for the 
existence of a link between threat and illusion, the effects of 
psychological threat have been difficult to document in the liter- 
ature regarding self-other illusion (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Also, the present work is noteworthy in that very few studies in the 
relationships domain have examined the motivational properties of 
illusion by means of direct manipulation of motives. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, Study 1 revealed that compared 
with individuals operating under standard thought-listing condi- 
tions, those who were instructed to be accurate xhibited reduced 
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perceived superiority. Indeed, in the accuracy condition, we ob- 
served negative inferiority--more negative thoughts about one's 
own than others' relationships. This result is consistent with an 
availability interpretation, suggesting that whereas we normally do 
not take note of negative features of our relationships, negative 
information may be highly available when we are led to "stop and 
take a good, hard look." (The need for negative comparison 
information may account for the appeal of media accounts of 
troubled relationships.) Findings regarding the effects of accuracy 
instructions are also congruent with the assumption that beliefs 
regarding one's own and others' relationships can to some extent 
reflect reality. Such findings have not previously been documented 
in the realm of close relationships, although in research regarding 
the self, illusion has been shown to be constrained by the speci- 
ficity and objectivity of the dimensions on which self-relevant 
beliefs are held (Allison et al., 1989; Dunning et al., 1989). 15 
The thoughts individuals listed in the control condition (and in 
Study 2) presumably approximate everyday belief systems regard- 
ing one's own and others' relationships. Individuals in the Study 1 
control condition ot only exhibited reliably more superior beliefs 
than those in the accuracy condition, but they also exhibited more 
superior beliefs than that which is evident on the basis of evalu- 
ations of specific relationship attributes. The relationship attributes 
questionnaire assessed a wide range of qualities, including central 
properties of relationships such as sexual gratification, partner 
physical attractiveness and sense of humor, and similarity of 
attitudes. Indeed, scores on this instrument exhibited reliable as- 
sociations with our perceived superiority measure, indicating that 
individuals' thoughts to some degree do reflect he reality of their 
involvements. Thus, although perceived superiority is a blend of 
reality and illusion, everyday belief systems appear to be substan- 
tially colored by illusion. 
We have argued that humans do not experience their relation- 
ships in a vacuum, suggesting that beliefs regarding relationships 
are socially defined. Does the pattern of results revealed in the 
present work support he claim that individuals are motivated to 
perceive their relationships as "superior"? Does the illusory com- 
ponent of perception reside in (a) beliefs about one's own rela- 
tionship, (b) beliefs about others' relationships, (c) beliefs about 
one's own relationship relative to beliefs about others' relation- 
ships, or (d) all three? Given that it is hard to conceive of an 
objective standard for use as a baseline from which to evaluate 
beliefs about one's own and others' relationships, it is difficult to 
provide an unequivocal empirical answer to this question. How- 
ever, to the extent hat this question can be addressed with some 
degree of confidence, we think the claim that beliefs regarding 
one's own relationships are illusory is supported by the fact that 
our accuracy and threat manipulations influenced positive and 
negative thoughts about one's own relationships. We think the 
claim that beliefs regarding others' relationships are illusory is 
supported by the fact that these manipulations influenced positive 
and negative thoughts about others' relationships. And we think 
the claim that superior beliefs are illusory is supported by the fact 
that these manipulations influenced the relative prevalence of 
positive and negative beliefs regarding one's own and others' 
relationships (i,e., three-factor interactions were observed; e.g., the 
disparity between all pairs of thoughts was greater given threat). 
Granted, our thought-listing technique is inherently comparative 
(i.e., participants indicated whether a feature was more typical of 
their own or others' relationships). However, the magnitude and 
consistency of the effects observed for each of the four forms of 
superiority suggests that individuals' beliefs reflect not only "own 
relationship illusion" and "other relationships illusion," but also 
"superiority-based illusion." 
It is noteworthy that relatively simple manipulations of psycho- 
logical threat and accuracy goals yielded such strong effects on 
perceived superiority, suggesting that the experience of threat and 
the desire to be accurate may be powerful motivational determi- 
nants of this phenomenon. Beyond demonstrating that superior 
beliefs to some degree reflect motivated processes, it is interesting 
to consider the broader implications of these findings. Relevant to 
psychological threat, we speculate that in everyday life individuals 
may experience threat because of a variety of circumstances. For 
example, partners may convey doubts regarding the future of a 
relationship, individuals may feel tempted by the presence of an 
attractive alternative, partners may witness unexpected breakups in 
their network of friends, and the media may convey alarming 
information regarding troubled relationships. Our findings uggest 
that such forms of threat induce enhanced attention to the positive 
features of one's own relationship, which may be an important 
coping mechanism through which individuals develop positive 
beliefs regarding their relationships. In turn, such beliefs may play 
a role in sustaining or enhancing couple well-being. As noted 
earlier, superior beliefs may serve the added benefit of reinforcing 
positive patterns of behavior. It is interesting--and paradoxical-- 
that threats to one's conviction may ultimately serve a positive, 
relationship-enhancing function. 
Relevant to accuracy goals, we speculate that although the need 
for accuracy may not be particularly strong in everyday life, there 
are some situations in which accuracy is emphasized (e.g., in 
marital counseling). Moreover, individuals may differ in their 
tendencies to hold accurate versus illusory beliefs (e.g., superior 
beliefs may be less evident among individuals uffering from 
depressive tendencies; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986). Our 
findings suggest hat accuracy goals may induce enhanced atten- 
tion to the negative features of one's own relationship, which in 
turn may impede relationship growth and vitality. Indeed, it is 
possible that counselors who place excessive mphasis on accu- 
racy (e.g., "taking an honest look at one's relationship") may yield 
unintended negative consequences for couples. 
Commitment and Perceived Superiority 
Consistent with previous research regarding relationship main- 
tenance processes (cf. Rusbult & Buunk, 1993), we suggested that 
15 Does the fact that participants inthe accuracy condition were able to 
"turn off" the impulse toward positive superiority mean that people are 
aware of their illusions or that this inclination is consciously controlled? 
The answer is no. That the injunction to be accurate yielded reduced 
superiority isnot to say that participants actively recognized their illusory 
beliefs, nor does this imply that they "told themselves" todeactivate heir 
impulses toward superior beliefs--the fact that a manipulation produces a
given effect does not necessarily imply that participants consciously 
brought about hat effect. Our findings imply suggest that when individ- 
uals actively work toward the goal of accuracy, they are somewhat less 
inclined to regard others' relationships more negatively than they regard 
their own. 
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commitment is a central variable in ongoing relationships, arguing 
that commitment would be positively associated with inclinations 
toward perceived superiority. In support of Hypothesis 3a, both 
studies revealed consistent evidence of a link between commit- 
ment level and tendencies to regard one's own relationship as 
superior to others' relationships. 
As noted earlier, there are two components of the commitment- 
superiority association. Presumably, at least part of the association 
of commitment with perceived superiority rests on the fact that 
objectively good relationships inspire strong commitment, along 
with realistic tendencies toregard one's own relationship as supe- 
rior (and others' relationships as inferior). When an individual 
judges that his or her relationship is .better than others' relation- 
ships--particularly with respect to the dimensions that he or she 
regards as important--there is a realistic basis for both commit- 
ment and perceived superiority. At the same time, we have argued 
that a portion of the observed associations with commitment 
reflect illusion, or the need to regard one's own relationship as 
superior to others' relationships. We adopted several strategies to 
"separate illusion from reality" and marshal support for this claim. 
First, we reasoned that if the motivational properties of com- 
mitment are particularly active when individuals experience doubt 
or anxiety regarding their relationships, we should find that the 
association of commitment with perceived superiority is enhanced 
under conditions of threat. In support of Hypothesis 3b, in Study 1 
the association of commitment with superior beliefs was consid- 
erably stronger among individuals who received psychologically 
threatening instructions than among those who received control or 
accuracy instructions. Second, we reasoned that the injunction to 
"be accurate" to some degree would deactivate the mecha- 
nisms supporting illusion, thereby weakening the commitment- 
superiority association. Consistent with Hypothesis 3c, in Study I 
the association of commitment with perceived superiority tended 
to be weaker among individuals who received accuracy instruc- 
tions than among those who received control or threat instructions. 
Third, we reasoned that if commitment motivates departures from 
strictly realistic perception, we should find that commitment ac- 
counts for unique variance in perceived superiority beyond eval- 
uations of specific relationship attributes. Consistent with Hypoth- 
esis 3d, Study 1 revealed that commitment accounts for substantial 
unique variance in perceived superiority beyond evaluations of 
specific attributes of one's own relationship. 
Adopting a fourth approach to separate illusion from reality, in 
Study 2 we used a naturally occurring control group by examining 
differences between partners who experienced (more or less) the 
same marriage, yet experienced differing motivation for illusion 
(i.e., greater or lesser commitment). Of course, the components of
a marrige may differ in salience or importance for the partners, and 
whereas Partner A experiences B's actions and attributes, Partner 
B experiences A's actions and attributes. But to the extent hat 
partners in a marriage arguably experience similar relationships, 
this analysis becomes informative. Consistent with Hypothesis 3e, 
within a marriage the more committed partner exhibited greater 
perceived superiority than the less committed partner. This ten- 
dency was evident for all four forms of superiority, including the 
form that is least directly linked to the particulars of one's own 
involvement--other r lationships negativity. The fact that relative 
commitment predicts the tendency to perceive more bad than good 
in others' relationships would seem to support the proposition that 
at least in part, perceived superiority rests on the motivational 
properties of commitment (i.e., the need to regard one's own 
relationship as superior). 
Thus far, we have reviewed evidence in support of the assertion 
that commitment motivates perceived superiority, suggesting that 
the inclination to regard one's own relationship as superior serves 
a relationship-enhancing function. But is it possible that in study- 
ing the perceived superiority of one's own relationship, we have 
simply provided yet another demonstration f the "motivated sell" 
(cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988)? It seems plausible that desire to 
enhance the self might contribute to the inclination to regard one's 
own relationship as superior (e.g., involvement in a healthy rela- 
tionship may contribute to self-esteem). However, in other re- 
search we have found that commitment exhibits weak or null 
associations with such "self" variables as self-esteem, affiliation 
and independence n eds, and attachment s yle (Rusbult, Martz, & 
Agnew, 1998; Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999). 
Moreover, in previous work we have found clear distinctions 
between simple self-versus-other differentiation and the type of 
own-relationship-versus-other-relationships differentiation ob- 
served in the present work: For example, whereas self-esteem 
predicts favorable differentiation between oneself and other per- 
sons, commitment more powerfully predicts favorable differenti- 
ation between one's own relationship and others' relationships 
(Martz et al., 1998). 
To determine whether the perceived superiority of one's own 
relationship serves a self-enhancing or relationship-enhancing 
function in the present work, in Study 2 we pitted self-esteem 
against commitment as predictors of perceived superiority. Con- 
sistent with Hypothesis 3f, these analyses revealed that commit- 
ment level is a powerful predictor of perceived superiority, ac- 
counting for substantial unique variance in this criterion beyond 
any variance attributable to self-esteem. At the same time, self- 
esteem tended to account for some unique variance in perceived 
superiority, suggesting that in addition to serving a relationship- 
enhancing function, this phenomenon may also, to some degree, 
serve a self-enhancing function. The contributions of relationship- 
specific variables and self-variables to explaining the perceived 
superiority of one's own relationship would appear to be a fruitful 
avenue for future research. 
On the basis of the evidence we have marshaled, it seems 
relatively safe to conclude that (a) superior beliefs rest in part on 
motivated processing and (b) commitment predicts tendencies 
toward perceived superiority. However, it does not necessarily 
follow that (c) commitment is the sole motivator of superior 
beliefs. (In fact, we have identified self-esteem as an additional 
plausible motivator of this phenomenon.) Our results for commit- 
ment are nonexperimental, so there may be alternative xplana- 
tions of the commitment-superiority association. For example, our 
findings might be explained by variables that are known to be 
associated with commitment, such as sizeable investment or social 
support for an involvement (Felmlee t al., 1990; Rusbult, 1983). 
Indeed, even if we assume that commitment is the central force 
underlying perceived superiority, it remains for future research to 
identify the precise mechanism(s) by which commitment yields 
such an association, determining whether such effects result from 
dependence, long-term orientation, self-partner merging, or com- 
munal orientation. 
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Alternative Interpretations 
Are there alternative interpretations of these findings? In the 
following paragraphs we consider the plausibility of several alter- 
native accounts of the effects of threat, accuracy instructions, and 
commitment on tendencies toward perceived superiority. 
Impression management a d socially desirable responding. Is 
it possible that findings for the threat condition emerged because 
participants sought o "set the experimenter straight" by demon- 
strating that their relationships differed from other students' bad 
relationships? Is it possible that findings for the accuracy condition 
emerged because the injunction to "be as accurate as possible" 
inhibited normal impulses toward impression management? Al- 
though desire to manage one's public impression might cause 
individuals to list many positive thoughts about heir own relation- 
ships, it seems less likely that impression management would 
cause them to list many negative thoughts about others' relation- 
ships. Also, it seems unlikely that tendencies toward perceived 
superiority are entirely attributable to socially desirable respond- 
ing, in that such an explanation does not account for the fact that 
the commitment-superiority association varied systematically 
across Study 1 instructional sets. Although we cannot wholly rule 
out the possibility of socially desirable responding in the present 
work, in previous tudies (Martz et al., 1998) we have found that 
the inclination to favorably differentiate one's own relationship 
from others' relationships is not substantially related to measures 
of self-deception r impression management (Paulhus, 1984). 
Differential availability of information. Is it possible that in- 
dividuals report a greater number of positive thoughts about heir 
own than others' relationships because they possess more infor- 
mation about their own relationships? Assuming that individuals 
possess more information about heir own relationships than about 
others' relationships--and assuming that in everyday life, people 
may present a somewhat more positive picture of their own rela- 
tionships than objectively iswarranted--it would seem logical that 
we would possess a greater amount of both positive and negative 
information regarding our own relationships. But although a pat- 
tern of negative inferiority was evident in the accuracy condition, 
this pattern did not emerge in the threat or control conditions: 
Individuals typically did not report more negative thoughts about 
their own relationships than about others' relationships. 
In a related vein, is it possible that the commitment-superiority 
association is stronger given threat because (a) individuals with 
low commitment already assume that most relationships are not 
particularly strong (perhaps due to false consensus), and accord- 
ingly were less influenced by the information the threat manipu- 
lation provides, or because (b) when threatened, it is easier for 
committed individuals to defend their relationships because they 
possess more positive information about heir relationships? Given 
that commitment represents more than simple positive evalua- 
t ion-given that commitment encompasses the effects of such 
variables as investment size and normative support (Bui et al., 
1996; Felmiee et al., 1990)---it seems unlikely that interactions 
with commitment are accounted for solely by the ability to bring to 
mind positive features of one's own relationship. Also, the 
commitment-superiority association was evident beyond variance 
attributable to ratings of specific relationship attributes. Thus, to 
explain why commitment and threat yield enhanced tendencies to 
report negative qualities in others' relationships, one must turn to 
motivational explanations resting on such processes as defensive- 
ness or suppression. 
Priming and shifting standards. Is it possible that the threat 
manipulation primed negative thoughts about relationships, 
thereby causing participants o list a greater number of negative 
thoughts regarding others' relationships? If this were so, priming 
should also have increased the availability of negative thoughts 
regarding one's own relationship. Instead, participants in the threat 
condition listed fewer negative thoughts regarding their own rela- 
tionships. Is it possible that results for the threat condition emerged 
because the threatening assertion that "college students' relation- 
ships. . ,  exhibit lower levels of adjustment" lowered individuals' 
comparison standards regarding others' relationships, thereby en- 
hancing the salience of positive qualities in their own relation- 
ships? We think this is unlikely, in that the threat manipulation not 
only influenced the number of positive thoughts about one's own 
relationship and negative thoughts about others' relationships, but 
it also interacted with commitment level. It is difficult to explain 
why priming or shifting standards would interact with both threat 
and commitment level to yield the observed pattern of findings. 
Evenhandedness. Is it possible that participants in the accu- 
racy condition interpreted the instruction to be accurate as a 
request o tenor their claims--to be more realistic and thus less 
positive? If so, could this have decreased the variability in partic- 
ipants' responses, thereby weakening the commitment-superiority 
association? First, we should note that restricted range does not 
appear to have been a problem in the accuracy condition (SDs for 
the four types of thought ranged from 1.61 to 2.49 in the accuracy 
condition, 1.13 to 3.22 in the control condition, and 1.34 to 3.71 in 
the threat condition). More to the point, evenhandedness in many 
respects is another way of describing the intent of the accuracy 
manipulation. Evidence from the accuracy condition was intended 
to illustrate that the illusory component of perceived superiority 
could be deactivated under some circumstances and that when 
deactivated, the normal motivational properties of commitment o 
longer strongly color tendencies toward perceived superiority. As 
such, findings from the accuracy condition provide a benchmark 
which should help one to understand the motivational properties 
evident under normal conditions and under conditions of threat. 
Thus, although several alternative interpretations might partially 
account for our results, these interpretations do not parsimoniously 
explain (a) differences in the effects of threat, control, and accu- 
racy instructions on all four types of thought regarding one' s own 
and others' relationships, (b) interactions of instructional set with 
commitment, and (c) the fact that these findings were evident 
beyond evaluations of specific relationship attributes. At the same 
time, several processes outlined above might contribute to the 
inclination to regard one's own relationship more favorably than 
others' relationships. Future research should use alternative exper- 
imental manipulations to examine the motivational properties of 
perceived superiority, exploring the contributions of processes 
such as priming, shifting standards, and differential vailability of 
information to inclinations toward perceived superiority. 
Functional Value of Perceived Superiority 
Study 2 addressed a final hypothesis, centering on the claim that 
perceived superiority is adaptive--that this pattern of thinking 
serves a functional purpose, toward the related goals of relation- 
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ship maintenance and relationship growth. Consistent with Hy- 
pothesis 4a, we found that perceived superiority was positively 
associated with dyadic adjustment. This prediction received sup- 
port not only in analyses examining concurrent associations of 
superiority with adjustment, but also in analyses examining change 
over time in adjustment. Consistent with Hypothesis 4b, we found 
that earlier tendencies toward perceived superiority were greater 
among couples whose relationships persisted over time than 
among those whose relationships later terminated. Indeed, among 
couples whose relationships later terminated, individuals exhibited 
other relationships ositivity, perceiving that others' relationships 
also possessed more positive than negative qualities. 
These findings are especially interesting in light of the fact that 
the reverse could as plausibly have been observed. For example, it
would not be unreasonable to expect that the relationships of 
individuals with superior beliefs might exhibit poor functioning, in 
that partners might feel less motivated to exert effort toward 
maintaining their relationships (e.g., unrealistic optimism might 
cause people to ignore unhealthy habits; cf. Taylor & Brown, 
1988; Weinstein, 1980). The present findings are also noteworthy 
in that these results provide rare evidence of the longer-term 
functional value of illusion. Existing evidence regarding the func- 
tional value of positive illusion (a) is largely limited to that 
obtained in the context of short-term laboratory experiments (for 
exceptions, see Murray et al., 1996a, 1996b) and (b) focuses 
primarily on individuals rather than relationships (cf. Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). Thus, our work can be seen to answer Taylor's 
(1983) call for research in "field situations of high involvement" 
(p. 1167). 
Of course, our results regarding the benefits of perceived supe- 
riority are correlational. Thus, it would be inappropriate o con- 
clude, for example, that perceived superiority causes enhanced 
persistence. Although in Study 2, earlier beliefs clearly preceded 
later breakup (i.e., it might appear that low levels of superiority 
cause breakup), it is equally plausible that people whose relation- 
ships were on the road to dissolution felt inclined to describe their 
relationships in a somewhat unsavory manner (i.e., being on the 
road to breakup yields reduced superiority). In future research it
would be fruitful to obtain further evidence of the interpersonal 
benefits of superior beliefs by experimentally manipulating per- 
ceived superiority in nonromantic involvements, determining 
whether interactions accompanied by superior beliefs are more 
congenial, trusting, or intimate. 
In Study 2, we performed mediation analyses, examining the 
plausibility of the assertion that perceived superiority partially 
mediates the association of commitment with couple well-being. 
Consistent with expectations, perceived superiority consistently 
accounted for significant variance in adjustment beyond that which 
is attributable to commitment. Also, commitment accounted for 
significantly reduced variance in adjustment once variance attrib- 
utable to perceived superiority was taken into consideration. At the 
same time, commitment accounted for unique variance in adjust- 
ment beyond superiority, either because commitment affects ad- 
justment by means of mechanisms other than perceived superiority 
(e.g., accommodation, willingness to sacrifice, derogation of alter- 
natives) or because commitment exerts direct effects on adjust- 
ment. Thus, and consistent with expectations, mediation of the 
commitment-adjustment association by perceived superiority was 
significant yet partial. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 
4c and are compatible with the assumption that perceived superi- 
ority represents one of several specific mechanisms by which com- 
mitted individuals sustain well-functioning, long-term involvements. 
Additional Findings 
The tendency toward perceived superiority is reliable among 
both men and women. However, in both studies women exhibited 
a greater number of relationship-relevant thoughts than men, and 
women exhibited stronger tendencies toward perceived superior- 
ity. These findings are consistent with other work regarding ender 
differences in North American samples, which tends to character- 
ize women as social-emotional experts (cf. Huston & Ashmore, 
1986; Peplau & Gordon, 1985): Women may pay more attention to 
relationship-relevant information, and may thereby develop a 
greater number of relationship-relevant cognitions--cognitions 
that center on both their own and others' relationships. Women 
may also more persistently make use of relationship-relevant in- 
formation in such a manner as to sustain conviction in their 
relationships. 
Two additional findings hould also be noted. First, both studies 
revealed evidence of an item valence main effect: Participants 
exhibited more positive than negative thoughts about relationships. 
This finding is consistent with the assumption that individuals hold 
relatively positive global beliefs about relationships (cf. Fiske, 
1980; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Second, both studies re- 
vealed evidence of an item target main effect: On average, partic- 
ipants had more to say about their own relationships than about 
others' relationships. This finding is consistent with the assump- 
tion that (a) the breadth of available information may be greater for 
one's own relationship than for others' relationships (e.g., we have 
direct experience with our own relationships and the internal 
events accompanying the involvement, whereas we have no access 
to the private issues or internal thoughts that accompany others' 
relationships) and (b) we may hold relatively more differentiated 
views about our own than about others' relationships (e.g., another 
relationship may simply be regarded as conflicted, whereas one's 
own relationship may be regarded as simultaneously conflicted 
and loving; cf. Sande, Goethals, & Radloff, 1988). 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Before closing, we should address everal potential limitations 
of our work. First, we should comment on our technique for 
assessing perceived superiority. Is it possible that when people are 
asked to categorize positive and negative thoughts as characteristic 
of either their own or others' relationships, their only option is to 
exhibit superior beliefs? There is nothing in this technique that 
demands uperior beliefs--participants are free to list as many 
thoughts as come to mind about their own and others' relation- 
ships, both positive and negative. Also, previous studies using 
modified measurement techniques have revealed findings parallel- 
ing those obtained using the present echnique. For example, 
parallel evidence isobtained when participants categorize thoughts 
as more characteristic of their own relationships, equally charac- 
teristic of their own and others' relationships, or more character- 
istic of others' relationships (Van Lange & Rusbult, 1995); parallel 
evidence is obtained when participants simply write open-ended 
descriptions of relationships (Agnew et al., 1998). Moreover, 
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research on self-other judgments reveals that quite subtle thought- 
listing instructions yield self-other superiority of a magnitude 
approximating that observed using the present technique (Messick 
et al., 1985). Thus, we believe that our measurement method is a 
good one--one with the added benefit of being a relatively unob- 
trusive, participant-driven means of examining natural belief sys- 
tems, including beliefs about he self, partner, and dyad. 
Second, we should ask whether it is appropriate to describe 
favorable differentiation between one's own and others' relation- 
ships as illusion. We have suggested that at least in part, this 
pattern of thought reflects the reality of ongoing relationships. 
When people judge that their own relationships are better than 
others' relationships with respect to the dimensions they regard as 
important, there is a realistic basis for favorable differentiation 
between one' s own and others' relationships. At the same time, we 
used a variety of empirical strategies to demonstrate hat in part, 
this pattern of thought reflects motivational forces. We believe that 
the full complement of evidence is most parsimoniously explained 
by a model that assumes ome motivational basis for the phenom- 
enon of perceived superiority. 
Third, we have reported correlational findings regarding the 
associations among commitment, perceived superiority, and cou- 
ple well-being. Thus, we have no direct evidence regarding the 
causal inks asserted in our model. We suspect hat in the final 
analysis, the associations among model variables hould be inter- 
preted in the context of a model of cyclical growth (cf. Van Lange 
et al., 1997; Wieselquist et al., 1999)--a model wherein variables 
represented as "later effects" feed back on and influence "earlier 
causes." For example, it seems obvious on the face of it that 
perceived superiority (a "later effect") is likely to influence feel- 
ings of satisfaction with a relationship, which in turn should 
strengthen commitment (see Footnote 5). Future research should 
explore plausible links in this sort of cyclical model, and should 
seek to explore the fascinating intricacies (rather than emphasizing 
the liabilities) of bidirectional cause-effect associations. 
Conclusions 
The present research began with the assumption that perceptions 
of relationship quality are socially defined and advanced the ar- 
gument hat individuals perceive their own relationships as both 
better than and not as bad as others' relationships. We developed 
a conceptual model of this phenomenon, suggesting that perceived 
superiority (a) results from motivational forces arising from threats 
to conviction regarding the desirability of a relationship, (b) is 
motivated by commitment, or by desire to sustain a long-term, 
well-functioning involvement, and (c) yields relationship- 
enhancing benefits in the form of persistence and enhanced ad- 
justment. The results of two studies were compatible with this 
analysis (although alternative perspectives cannot be entirely dis- 
counted), suggesting that it may be fruitful to conceptualize per- 
ceived superiority as one of several mechanisms by which indi- 
viduals maintain stable and vital ongoing close relationships. 
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